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ANONYMITY, THE PRODUCTION OF GOODS,
AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Jeffrey M. Skopek*
In this Article, I demonstrate that anonymity has been misconceived as
an aspect of privacy, and that understanding this mistake reveals a
powerful and underutilized set of legal tools for facilitating and controlling
the production of information and other social “goods” (ranging from
uncorrupted votes and campaign donations to tissue samples and funding
for biomedical research). There are three core components to this analysis.
First, I offer a taxonomic analysis of existing law, revealing that in areas
ranging from contract and copyright to criminal law and constitutional law,
the production of information and other goods is being targeted by three
types of anonymity rules—rules that make anonymity and non-anonymity
into rights, conditions of exercising rights, and most surprisingly, triggers
that extinguish rights. Second, I propose a theory that makes sense of our
law’s uses of these rules, identifying a cohesive set of functions that they
perform across three phases in the production of a good: its creation,
evaluation, and allocation. Third, I use my taxonomic and theoretical
analysis to develop generally applicable lessons for the design of law and
policy. Applying these lessons to a set of difficult and pressing questions
concerning the production of specific biomedical and democratic goods, I
demonstrate that they reveal innovative solutions that balance a wide
variety of important and conflicting interests and concerns.
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INTRODUCTION
In Representative Government, John Stuart Mill suggests that the ability
to vote anonymously in political elections is a threat to democracy.1 The
problem with anonymous voting, Mill argues, is that it suggests to the
elector “that the suffrage is given to him for himself; for his particular use
and benefit, and not as a trust for the public.”2 Against this view, Mill
argues that the elector’s vote “is not a thing in which he has an option; it
has no more to do with his personal wishes than the verdict of a juryman.”3
Rather, the voter’s choice “is strictly a matter of duty; he is bound to give it
according to his best and most conscientious opinion of the public good.”4
Thus, “the duty of voting, like any other public duty, should be performed
under the eye and criticism of the public,” such that the elector will “adhere
to conduct of which at least some decent account can be given.”5

1. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS
(London, Parker, Son & Bourn 1861).
2. Id. at 190.
3. Id. at 191–92.
4. Id. at 192.
5. Id. at 193, 200.
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In an era in which the secret ballot is often taken as an integral part of a
legitimate democracy,6 Mill’s argument is striking for its very different
understanding of the liberal legal subject that it presupposes. What interests
me about this tension is that it is suggestive of how differently a democratic
society might see the anonymity and identification of its citizens, how
central these visions can be to its legal order, and how limited our
understanding is of the role anonymity plays in our law today.
This is not to say that we know nothing about anonymity in our law. The
right to anonymous communication under the First Amendment has been
extensively explored,7 as has digital anonymity.8 There has been limited
but important work done on the tension between secrecy and disclosure in
constitutional law,9 the social norms that govern anonymous
communication and their functions,10 and the desirability of anonymity as a
tool of democratic governance.11 There has also been significant attention
paid to the technical question of whether and when “anonymization” of data
is possible in practice.12 However, this existing scholarship has not
recognized the extent to which anonymity is used and regulated by rules in
nearly every area of law—and more importantly, by rules whose primary
purpose is not the protection of privacy.
For example, on Election Day 2012, 22 percent of registered voters
shared how they voted on social networking sites such as Facebook or
Twitter, often by posting photos of their ballots.13 In response to this new
social media trend, election officials in some states provided public notice
that this practice violated state election law, which gave rise to widespread
public attention to these previously underpublicized restrictions.14 For
6. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE 5–6 (2002).
7. E.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and
Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537 (2007) (providing a detailed positive and
normative analysis of the impact of allowing anonymous speech); Chesa Boudin, Note,
Publius and the Petition: Doe v. Reed and the History of Anonymous Speech, 120 YALE L.J.
2140 (2011) (providing a history of anonymous speech in the United States). There has also
been very limited attention to anonymity as a Fourth Amendment right. See Christopher
Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to
Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213 (2002).
8. E.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity in the Balance, in DIGITAL ANONYMITY AND
THE LAW: TENSIONS AND DIMENSIONS 5 (C. Nicoll et al. eds., 2003).
9. E.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between
Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1991).
10. E.g., Saul Levmore, The Anonymity Tool, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2191 (1996) (providing
discursive analysis of social norms governing anonymous communication and their
relevance to law).
11. E.g., James A. Gardner, Anonymity and Democratic Citizenship, 19 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 927 (2011).
12. E.g., Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814 (2011).
13. See Lee Rainie, Social Media and Voting, PEW RES. CENTER (Nov. 6, 2012),
http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/social-vote-2012.aspx.
14. Julianne Pepitone, Tweeted Your Ballot? You May Have Broken the Law, CNN
MONEY (Nov. 6, 2012, 4:36 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/06/technology/
mobile/photo-ballot-voting-law/index.html. For an overview of these laws, see State Law:
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although many people conceptualize anonymous voting as a right, it is in
fact a requirement of some form in most states.15 In Minnesota, for
example: “If a voter, after marking a ballot, shows it to anyone except as
authorized by law, the election judges shall refuse to deposit the ballot in
any ballot box and shall place it among the spoiled ballots.”16
In other contexts, anonymity is a right, but the implications of this right
have not been fully appreciated. For example, in 1997, Harvard University
revealed that, over the prior eight years, it had spent $88 million
anonymously acquiring 52.6 acres of land for a campus expansion, using a
buying agent to avoid problems of holdout and strategic bargaining.17
While Harvard subsequently faced significant public criticism for doing
so,18 this type of anonymous purchasing is facilitated by the law of agency,
which generally allows an agent who enters into a contract on behalf of a
principal to protect the anonymity of the principal—even by falsely
representing that he is not acting on behalf of any principal.19
Finally, there are situations in which anonymity is neither a right nor a
requirement, but rather a trigger that extinguishes rights. For example, in
the early 1990s, members of the Havasupai Indian tribe donated blood for
use in biomedical research at Arizona State University.20 They did so on
what they claim was the express understanding that their blood would only
be used for diabetes research to which they wanted to contribute.21 When
they later learned that their blood was also being used in other research to
which they had ethical objections, they sued for the return of their blood
and for damages related to the unconsented use.22 Although the legal
merits of these claims were never decided because the parties settled,23 the
public controversy surrounding the case drew critical attention to the fact
that under current federal regulations, a researcher can conduct research that

Documenting the Vote 2012, DIGITAL MEDIA L. PROJECT (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.dmlp.
org/state-law-documenting-vote-2012.
15. See infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
16. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204C.17 (West 2009).
17. Sara Rimer, Some Seeing Crimson at Harvard ‘Land Grab,’ N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
1997, at A16.
18. See id.
19. Doing so will generally only affect the enforceability of the contract if the principal
or agent had notice that the third party would not have dealt with the principal. See 2
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.11(4) cmt. d (2006). The implications of this right
are significant. For instance, the case of Harvard suggests that the exercise of eminent
domain for use by private parties may often be unnecessary to avoid problems of holdout
and strategic bargaining, raising the question of whether the “public use” requirement for
takings should be more restrictively interpreted. For an argument that it should, see Daniel
B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on
Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2006).
20. See generally Katherine Drabiak-Syed, Lessons From Havasupai Tribe v. Arizona
State University Board of Regents: Recognizing Group, Cultural, and Dignitary Harms As
Legitimate Risks Warranting Integration into Research Practice, 6 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL
L. 175 (2010).
21. Id. at 175.
22. Id. at 185–97.
23. Id. at 175.
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violates the scope of a research participant’s specific consent merely by
anonymizing the tissue or blood sample that he or she donated.24
These varied uses of anonymity in our law—as a requirement in voting,
as a right when purchasing land, and as a trigger that extinguishes rights in
biomedical research—may appear to be unrelated. But my argument in this
Article is that they are in fact all part of a cohesive and previously
unrecognized class of legal interventions that use anonymity not to protect
privacy, but rather to facilitate and control the production and circulation of
information and other social “goods.”25 These interventions are pervasive,
stretching from contract and copyright to criminal law and constitutional
law.
Our failure to recognize this class of rules derives from the
misconception of anonymity as a mere tool or aspect of privacy.26 This
conflation has obscured an important factual difference between the two
conditions: under the condition of privacy, we have knowledge of a
person’s identity, but not of an associated personal fact, whereas under the
condition of anonymity, we have knowledge of a personal fact, but not of
the associated person’s identity. In this sense, privacy and anonymity are
flip sides of each other. And for this reason, they can often function in
opposite ways: whereas privacy often hides facts about someone whose
identity is known by removing information and other goods associated with
the person from public circulation, anonymity often hides the identity of
someone about whom facts are known for the purpose of putting such
goods into public circulation.27 This Article explores, explains, and draws
lessons about this function of anonymity.
Part I demonstrates that anonymity plays a pervasive role in the
production of goods across our law. Approaching our law taxonomically, I
identify three distinct and pervasive ways in which production is facilitated
and controlled by rules that regulate either anonymity or “non-anonymity”
(which, in the interest of simplicity, I will refer to as “attribution”). The
24. Id. at 199–200.
25. While some of the “goods” that I will discuss can be characterized as informational
(e.g., political speech, tips to the police, information provided as part of bounty schemes, and
the personal data protected by Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act), many of
them cannot (e.g., sperm, organs, campaign donations, artwork, and the type of identity
protected by a tort claim for misappropriation of identity), and for others this would be an
incomplete or forced characterization (e.g., votes, tissue for biomedical research,
copyrighted works, purchase offers, and electioneering communications).
26. For example, one can find suggestions that anonymity is one of several types of
privacy. E.g., Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 433 (1980);
Slobogin, supra note 7, at 233–66; Alan F. Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues
and Proposals for the 1970’s: Part I–The Current Impact of Surveillance on Privacy, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1021 (1966). Others suggest that anonymity is the perfect realization
of privacy. E.g., Shawn C. Helms, Translating Privacy Values with Technology, 7 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 288, 300–01 (2001); see also Ian Lloyd, Privacy, Anonymity and the
Internet, ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L., Mar. 2009, at 1. Still others see it as a tool of privacy.
E.g., Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869, 876
(1996).
27. I explore this distinction in more detail in a companion article tentatively titled
Reasonable Expectations of Anonymity.
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first are rules that protect a right of anonymity or attribution, which I term
“entitlement rules.” The second are rules that require anonymity or
attribution as a condition of exercising a right or capacity, which I term
“conditioning rules.” The third, and most surprising, are rules under which
anonymity or attribution is a trigger that extinguishes a right or capacity,
which I term “extinguishing rules.” In revealing the depth of these three
categories of rules across our law—in domains including, but not limited to,
contract, copyright, tort, property, criminal law, election law, and
constitutional law—I arrive at the questions of whether there is any
coherence to their use, what specific functions they perform, and how they
operate.
Part II proposes a theory that makes sense of our law’s uses of these
rules, identifying a cohesive set of functions that they perform. In
developing this theory, I differentiate between three phases in the
production of goods—between three types of actions that our law might
seek to incentivize or control. First, there are the actions that make the
good available to members of the public for the first time, which I will refer
to as the “creation” of the good. Second, there are actions that interpret or
draw inferences from a good, which I will refer to as the “evaluation” of the
good. Third, there are actions that alter who possesses and controls the use
of a good, which I will refer to as the “allocation” of the good. Having
framed production in this way, I argue that the seemingly opposite
anonymity and attribution versions of each category of rule often serve
common functions. Specifically, I argue that they are both used by our law
to shape the costs and benefits of creating goods in order to align private
production incentives with public goals and values, control information
flows in order to address evaluation costs associated with using goods, and
reallocate rights of control over goods in order achieve their efficient or fair
allocation. In identifying these functions, I do not take a position on
whether they justify our law as a normative matter. Rather, I advance a
descriptive and explanatory argument about how the rules work in order to
better understand the functions that they perform in our law.
Part III demonstrates that my taxonomic and theoretical analysis not only
identifies and explains the pervasive role of anonymity in our law for the
first time, but also reveals new solutions to difficult questions of law and
policy. It does so by providing a framework of previously unrecognized
“design levers.”28 These levers include the six types of rules that I identify
in my taxonomic analysis, and the three phases of production that I identify
in my theoretical analysis. In this Part, I draw on these levers in developing
generally applicable lessons for the design of institutions that seek to
incentivize or control the production of goods. I also demonstrate that these
lessons reveal innovative solutions to difficult and pressing questions
concerning the production of specific political and biomedical goods.

28. On the concept of design levers, see, for example, Yochai Benkler, Law, Policy, and
Cooperation, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 299,
312–23 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010).
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These include the questions of how to manage financial conflicts of interest
in academic research that is intended to provide the basis for public policy
(a problem highlighted by inquiries into the financial crisis of 2008), and
how to allocate control over human tissue samples in research biobanks (the
resolution of which will significantly shape the future of medicine). In
conclusion, after demonstrating these practical applications of my analysis,
I turn briefly to the relationship between anonymity and democracy with
which this introduction begins, exploring how seemingly equivalent
solutions to a given problem of production may in fact embody competing
conceptions of the proper rights and capacities of the subjects of a liberal
democracy.
I. A TAXONOMY OF ANONYMITY RULES
In this Part, I develop a taxonomic analysis of existing law that identifies
three distinct and pervasive ways in which the production of goods is
facilitated and controlled by “anonymity rules”—by which I mean rules that
regulate either anonymity or attribution. Specifically, I identify and
differentiate between rules that treat anonymity or attribution as a right
(entitlement rules), a condition of exercising a right or capacity
(conditioning rules), and a trigger that extinguishes a right or capacity
(extinguishing rules). In short, there are six core types of rules, which can
be represented as follows:
Anonymity

Attribution

Entitlement Rule

Anonymity is a right.

Attribution is a right.

Conditioning Rule

Anonymity is a
condition of exercising a
right or capacity.

Attribution is a condition
of exercising a right or
capacity.

Extinguishing
Rule

Anonymity extinguishes
a right or capacity.

Attribution extinguishes
a right or capacity.

It is important to note that I propose these categories on instrumental and
not formal grounds, suggesting only that they provide a useful way of
thinking about this previously unexplored legal space. Further, the
distinction that I draw between conditioning rules and extinguishing rules is
subtle at times, for whenever anonymity or attribution extinguishes a right,
it could be said that the opposite was a condition of having that right. What
makes them different, however, is the surprising role that adversity plays in
extinguishing rules. Under these rules, an adverse party is able to trigger
the loss of one’s rights by imposing anonymity or attribution, which is
different—in a way that is legally and normatively significant—from
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merely failing to meet a condition of anonymity or attribution in order to
exercise a right.29
In what follows, I will survey the many anonymity and attribution rules
in our law that fall into my taxonomy but that have never been
characterized in these terms. My primary aim in doing so is to substantiate
my claim that anonymity, unlike privacy, plays a crucial role in facilitating
and controlling the production and public circulation of goods. I will show
that it does so across our law, in domains including, but not limited to,
contract, property, tort, copyright, criminal law, election law, and
constitutional law.30 In addition, this analysis suggests that we are using
these rules in unreflective, untailored, and unsystematic ways, and that
important policy choices are being made without awareness of the tacit
theories of production that they embody.
Before I turn to this analysis, however, I must briefly clarify four features
of anonymity, as the concept is often misunderstood.31 First, it is crucial to
recognize that anonymity is never perfect: everything that we consider to
be anonymous will contain some information that eliminates the majority of
individuals in the world from the group of potential sources.32 Second, the
degree to which something is anonymous can depend on context, including
the knowledge of the person seeing it.33 Third, the quantity of identifying
information associated with something that is anonymous is rarely fixed, in
that more information will often be available at some additional cost or
effort.34 Fourth, anonymity encompasses pseudonymity, as all cases of
pseudonymity can be mapped onto the anonymity continuum: there are
29. This character of extinguishing rules is also shared with rules in other areas of law,
such as the rule of adverse possession. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1123 (1984) (explaining adverse
possession). While adverse possession could logically be characterized as a subrule in a
“conditioning rule” that sets out the criteria for having a property right (which includes the
condition that there be no successful adverse possessors), there are legal and normative
reasons to conceptualize adverse possession as also being something distinct from this.
30. While my core focus in this Part is positive cases of each type of rule, I also
highlight some cases where the rules are absent, as this negative legal space in the taxonomy
creates legal relationships that can be equally valuable in institutional design. Cf. Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 42 (1913) (arguing that the absence of a right creates a legal
relationship).
31. I draw here on David Post’s helpful work on this topic. See David G. Post, Pooling
Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and Limited Liability in
Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 148–152.
32. For example, an anonymous hospital record will inform us of when and where the
person was treated and what treatments they received. Likewise, anonymous graffiti on a
subway platform will inform us that its source was physically present on that particular
platform at some point during the period since the platform was last painted. Id. at 149 n.26.
33. For example, if I know the name of a person who is the only person to have received
a rare medical treatment at a given hospital, I will be able to attach a name to his medical
record. Or, if I know the name of the only person who entered the subway platform after it
was painted, I will be able to identify the source of the graffiti.
34. To access this information, we might need to contact third parties, such as persons
familiar with the number of times a given procedure has been performed at a hospital. Or,
we might need techniques that allow us to access information that is available on the
anonymous object, such as fingerprints left in the paint of the graffiti. Id. at 150.
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cases in which pseudonymity does not differ from strong anonymity,35 and
cases in which it conveys some identifying information like weak
anonymity.36 The ability of anonymity (and pseudonymity) to perform the
legal functions that I will identify in this Article will turn on the extent of its
unavoidable contextual incompleteness.
A. Entitlement Rules
In this section, I will begin my taxonomic analysis of our law with a
survey of the wide variety of rules that provide anonymity or attribution
entitlements.
1. Anonymity As a Right
The right to purchase and receive a good or service anonymously is
perhaps the most pervasive anonymity entitlement, having its foundations
in numerous sources of law. At times, these sources define the right
narrowly. For example, there are state laws that expressly allow for the
purchase of specific types of goods anonymously.37 Other forms of the
right apply more generally. For example, the law of agency generally
allows an agent who enters into a contract on behalf of a principal to falsely
represent that he is not acting on behalf of any principal, thereby creating a
right to contract anonymously.38
Contract can also give rise to anonymity rights, one of the most common
being the right of sperm donors to anonymous genetic parenthood. This
right is generally created in the first instance by private law—by the
donor’s contract or by the recipient’s contract with the bank—of which
donors have been found to be third-party beneficiaries.39 But the right may
35. For example, a book might be labeled “anonymous” because the author is unknown;
or it might be labeled “anonymous” because the author chose this as his pseudonym. In fact,
in an early recorded use of the word “anonymous” by Pliny the Elder, it is a description and
a name: “Anonymos, finding no name to be called by, got thereupon the name Anonymos.”
PLINY, THE HISTORIE OF THE WORLD: COMMONLY CALLED, THE NATURALL HISTORIE OF C.
PLINIUS SECUNDUS 274 (Philemon Holland trans., London, Adam Islip 1601). Further, there
would be little difference between either of these situations and a situation in which an
author published each of his novels under different unrelated pseudonyms. Post, supra note
31, at 152.
36. When the same person uses a pseudonym more than once, the name begins to serve
identifying functions. It conveys that the source of one thing is the same as the source of
another, and in this way, allows for the aggregation of certain data about that source.
Further, what makes pseudonymity distinct from anonymity, and a subset, is that whereas the
anonymity continuum is the result of the aggregation of various types of identifying
information, the pseudonymity continuum is the result of one specific type of aggregation—
namely, aggregation of things identified with a given name. I return to this point in Part III,
showing that this type of anonymity can serve unique and useful functions.
37. For example, there are five states that allow the anonymous purchase of lottery
tickets: Delaware, Kansas, Maryland, North Dakota, and Ohio. There are also laws and
doctrines that indirectly facilitate anonymous purchasing, such as the first sale doctrine in
copyright. Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889,
896 & nn.29–30 (2011).
38. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
39. E.g., Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 873 (Ct. App. 2000).
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also have public law components. For example, a donor might have a state
statutory right not to be named as a parent on a birth certificate.40 Or, more
fundamentally, the right to create and enforce donor anonymity contracts
might have a basis in the right to procreate recognized by the
Constitution,41 or the privacy and anonymity rights recognized by some
state constitutions.42
Another very different public law right to anonymous “paternity” comes
from the Visual Artists Rights Act of 199043 (VARA), which recognizes the
so-called “moral right of paternity,” or “right of attribution,” of authors of
qualifying works of visual art to keep the works physically anonymous.44
This unusual right appears to be the only way, other than a copyright or a
privacy interest, for authors to prevent truthful attribution of their work—at
least by a private party.45 While an author of an anonymous or
pseudonymous work could in theory try to prevent attributed publication

40. E.g., In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115 (Md. 2007). However, state statutes might
also cut the other way. For example, several states currently have statutes permitting donorconceived children to de-anonymize their donor based on a satisfactory showing of “‘good
cause’ or similar standard.” Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An
Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835,
898–99 (2000) (quoting Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Adoption, Reproductive
Technologies, and Genetic Information, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 125, 138 (1998)).
41. See I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests, 96
MINN. L. REV. 423, 513–17 (2011). This right could take two forms: a donor could have a
right to procreate by donating anonymous sperm; or perhaps more likely, a recipient could
have a right to procreate using anonymous sperm.
42. In one of the few cases involving a challenge to a donor anonymity contract, the
California Court of Appeal held that the state constitution protected the donor’s right of
privacy in both his “medical history” and his “identity.” See Johnson, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
876. While the court ultimately found that the state had stronger interests than the donor in
the disclosure of his medical history, it directed the trial court to craft an order such that the
donor’s identity would “remain undisclosed to the fullest extent possible,” thereby protecting
his anonymity. Id.
43. Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 601–610, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128–33 (1990) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
44. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (defining the right of attribution). Although
at least one commentator has suggested that the right of attribution does not include a
negative right to publish anonymously or pseudonymously, see, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal
Kwall, Authors in Disguise: Why the Visual Artists Rights Act Got It Wrong, 2007 UTAH L.
REV. 741, 745 n.20, the authoritative comments to the Berne Treaty (which VARA was
implementing) state that it does, see WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., GUIDE TO THE
BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (PARIS ACT,
1971) 41 (1978), as does the Congressional House Report, see H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 14
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6924, as do multiple courts of appeals in
dicta. See Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 296–97, 306 (7th Cir. 2011) (discussing
the Second Circuit case Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995), and
the First Circuit case Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2006)).
45. If the attribution is false, an author might have a cause of action for misappropriation
of identity or right of publicity, see R. David Grant, Rights of Privacy–An Analytical Model
for the Negative Rights of Attribution, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 529, 554–63, or for libel or unfair
competition. See Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C.
L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1997).
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under a tort theory of misappropriation of identity or right of publicity, it
appears that no author has ever done so successfully.46
With respect to the government, however, the story is quite different, as
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that “an author’s decision to remain
anonymous . . . is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First
Amendment.”47 However, the complete scope of this anonymity right is
not entirely clear. For example, it is unclear whether it is merely a negative
right against compelled disclosure, or an affirmative right to conceal
oneself.48 Nor is the right absolute. For example, if an anonymous speaker
is sued for defamation, the plaintiff may have the right to a subpoena
requiring disclosure of the speaker’s identity.49
Finally, there are the many statutory anonymity rights given in return for
speech. Various federal bounty schemes provide permanent or temporary
anonymity rights in exchange for information;50 and in exchange for
testimony, federal and state witness protection programs provide one of the
only anonymity-pseudonymity rights backed by criminal penalties.51 The
latter right is generally even valid against parties who have legal claims
against the witness,52 though not against the noncustodial parents of the
witness’s children (the rights of parents being a theme that comes up in
various places in the taxonomy).53

46. One of the few courts to address this issue held that the right of publicity did not
allow an author of a pseudonymous book to prevent a publisher from using his real name
when it had the right to publish the book pseudonymously. Ellis v. Hurst, 121 N.Y.S. 438
(Sup. Ct. 1910).
47. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995). This is just one of
many Supreme Court cases to recognize the right. See Boudin, supra note 7, at 2164–68
(surveying cases).
48. The Second Circuit has ruled “the concealment of one’s face while demonstrating” is
not constitutionally protected. Church of Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356
F.3d 197, 209 (2d Cir. 2004). It is also unclear whether it includes a right to read and listen,
as well as speak and associate. For an argument that it does, see Catherine Crump, Note,
Data Retention: Privacy, Anonymity, and Accountability Online, 56 STAN. L. REV. 191, 217
(2003).
49. Currently, courts use one of four standards to decide. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky,
Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn from John Doe?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1373,
1373–76 (2009).
50. See generally Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The
Economics and Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141,
1201–07 (providing an overview of IRS, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, and SEC
programs and the False Claims Act).
51. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 3521–3528 (2012).
52. For example, a creditor’s inability to find a protected witness does not constitute an
unconstitutional taking of his property. Melo-Tone Vending, Inc. v. United States, 666 F.2d
687, 689 (1st Cir. 1981). However, if the protected witness is under investigation, arrested,
or charged for certain offenses, the U.S. attorney general must disclose his identity and
location. See 18 U.S.C. § 3521(b)(1)(G).
53. Parents have a constitutional due process right to notice and a hearing on the
relocation. See Joan Comparet-Cassani, Balancing the Anonymity of Threatened Witnesses
Versus a Defendant’s Right of Confrontation: The Waiver Doctrine After Alvarado, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1165, 1208 (2002).
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2. Attribution As a Right
Perhaps one of the most frequently discussed rights of non-anonymity—
or attribution—is the general right of attribution of authors, which is widely
recognized by the copyright law of most Western nations.54 While U.S.
copyright law does not recognize such a general right, two acts grant it in
limited forms. First is VARA, which provides authors of a narrowly
defined class of artwork with a right to require truthful attribution of those
works.55 Second is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which
makes it illegal—in a limited set of situations—to intentionally alter or
remove from a copyrighted work “any copyright management information,”
which includes the “name of, and other identifying information about” the
author of the work.56 It was once thought that the Lanham Federal
Trademarks Act also provided the basis for a limited right of attribution,57
but the Supreme Court has since clarified that it does not,58 so to go beyond
VARA and the DMCA, an author of a copyrighted work will need to
contract for the right as part of a licensing agreement.59
Along with creative works, one might have a right of attribution in one’s
children. A woman giving birth generally has the right to be named on the
child’s birth record pursuant to hospital and state recording procedures, as
does her husband if she is married.60 Otherwise, a man has the right to be
named if the woman consents, or if he successfully brings a paternity suit in
court.61 Further, if the woman giving birth is a gestational surrogate, the
genetic or legal parents might have a superseding right to be named
instead.62 This right can derive from an ex post court order based on

54. Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1549;
see also Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademarks
Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263, 265 (2004).
55. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)–(2). Some state statutes provide additional attribution
rights. Lacey, supra note 54, at 1550 nn.92–94.
56. 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b)–(c). This text suggests that an author who includes his name as
part of the copyright management information will have a limited right of attribution. Jane C.
Ginsburg, Moral Rights in the U.S.: Still in Need of a Guardian Ad Litem, 30 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 73, 74–79 (2012). However, there is conflicting case law. Edward L.
Carter, Copyright Ownership of Online News: Cultivating a Transformation Ethos in
America’s Emerging Statutory Attribution Right, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 161, 183–88 (2011).
57. E.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Naming Rights: Attribution and Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV.
789, 791; Ginsburg, supra note 54, at 265–66.
58. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003).
59. There are, however, several limits to using copyright as the basis for a contractual
right of attribution. See Ginsburg, supra note 54, at 280.
60. Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38
UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1425–28 (1990); Steven Snyder & Mary Byrn, The Use of Prebirth
Parentage Orders in Surrogacy Proceedings, 39 FAM. L.Q. 633, 636–37 (2005).
61. Czapanskiy, supra note 60, at 1425.
62. See, e.g., In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 127–33 (Md. 2007); Culliton v. Beth Isr.
Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1139–41 (Mass. 2001).
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genetic analysis,63 or in a few states, from a prebirth court order based on
the consent of the parties.64
B. Conditioning Rules
Having surveyed the many rules that grant an entitlement in anonymity
or attribution, I will now turn to the rules that require anonymity or
attribution as a condition of exercising a right or capacity, thereby
controlling key inputs in production decisions. Like other types of secondorder rules, such as liability and inalienability rules, these conditioning
rules should be seen not as limiting the exercise of already-allocated rights
and capacities, but rather as constitutive of them.65
1. Anonymity As a Condition
The nearly universal use of the secret ballot in general elections is
perhaps the most readily identifiable example of anonymity as a condition
of exercising a right.66 While it is rare for a court to expressly hold that the
secret ballot is a requirement rather than a right,67 or for a state to prohibit
voters from showing their completed ballot to anyone in the polling
station,68 anonymity is nevertheless imposed in the sense that most states
invalidate ballots that are marked in a way that could identify the voter,69
and many prohibit taking a photo of one’s ballot inside a polling place.70
Thus, it is generally impossible for a voter to prove how he or she voted.
Anonymity is, at times, also a condition of being a juror. For example, in
grand jury proceedings, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2) covers

63. Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies: ARTs,
Mistakes, Sex, Race, & Law, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 37–39 (2003) (listing cases).
64. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 801–803 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 362–64 (2001 &
Supp. 2013).
65. For example, as Madeline Morris has noted,
[T]he view that liability and inalienability rules do not fully protect entitlements
(and the presumable corollary, that only property rules can fully honor
entitlements) rests on a flaw in Calabresi and Melamed’s analysis. The three rules
do not protect and define the transferability of an already-allocated entitlement;
rather, the rules themselves constitute the particular entitlement.
Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 843 (1992).
66. See generally Boudin, supra note 7, at 2160.
67. But see Nabors v. Manglona, 829 F.2d 902, 905 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that ballots
marked with code names not only posed a problem of fraud, but also threatened the rights of
those who choose not to participate in the fraud, as their votes become more identifiable);
McCavitt v. Registrars of Voters, 434 N.E.2d 620, 631 (Mass. 1982) (“[T]he right to a secret
ballot is not an individual right which may be waived by a good faith voter.”).
68. But see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204C.17 (West 2009) (“If a voter, after marking a
ballot, shows it to anyone except as authorized by law, the election judges shall refuse to
deposit the ballot in any ballot box and shall place it among the spoiled ballots.”). It is more
common for a state to allow disclosure. See Kenneth R. Mayer, Political Realities and
Unintended Consequences: Why Campaign Finance Reform Is Too Important To Be Left to
the Lawyers, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1069, 1087 (2003).
69. Mayer, supra note 68, at 1087.
70. For an overview of state laws on using cameras inside polling places, see State Law:
Documenting the Vote 2012, supra note 14.
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“the anonymity of grand jurors,”71 and in civil and criminal trials, courts
may in special circumstances impose anonymity on jurors (as well as their
votes).72
Outside the responsibilities and capacities of public citizenship,
anonymity is at times imposed on parties in market transactions that relate
to the provision of public services. For example, the California Public
Utilities Commission allows the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E)
to engage in over-the-counter transactions in natural gas–related derivatives
and financial instruments with its customers or affiliates, but requires that it
use a broker so that the “transactions are anonymous.”73 This prevents
PG&E from “directly and intentionally impact[ing] a particular customer,
which could have anticompetitive impacts if PG&E enters into contracts
with counterparties.”74
In the private realm, anonymity may also, at times, be imposed as a
condition of exercising certain aspects of self-determination—such as one’s
ability to control the disposition of one’s organs upon death. Although
rarely discussed in these terms, anonymity is a de facto condition imposed
by laws that prohibit directed donations of cadaveric organs.75 While such
prohibitions are currently rare in the United States,76 they have not always
been so,77 and these prohibitions are strictly imposed in many European
71. In re Am. Historical Ass’n, 49 F. Supp. 2d 274, 282–83 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Although
Rule 6(e)(2) does not specify the scope of “matters occurring before the grand jury,” courts
have construed the phrase to include any item that would reveal the identities of grand jury
members. Roger A. Fairfax Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional Design, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 703, 748 (2008); Brian L. Porto, Annotation, What Are “Matters
Occurring Before Grand Jury” Within Prohibition of Rule 6(e) of Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 154 A.L.R. FED. 385, 403, 405, 418 (1999). Grand juries also can be seen as
protecting the anonymity of the sources of the evidence presented to them, and thereby
performing the intermediary function proposed by Saul Levmore in his work on anonymity
as a tool of communication. See Wendy J. Gordon, Norms of Communication and
Commodification, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2321, 2324 (1996).
72. Courts have held that an anonymous jury is proper “where the jury needs protection
from external sources and where reasonable precautions to minimize any prejudicial effects
of an anonymous jury on the defendant are taken.” William D. Bremer, Annotation,
Propriety of Using Anonymous Juries in State Criminal Cases, 60 A.L.R. 5TH 39, 39 (1998)
(discussing the use of anonymous juries in state criminal cases); see also G.M. Buechlein,
Annotation, Propriety of, and Procedure for, Ordering Names and Identities of Jurors To Be
Withheld from Accused in Federal Criminal Trial—“Anonymous Juries,” 93 A.L.R. FED.
135, 138–39 (1989).
73. In re Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 85 Cal. Pub. Util. Rep. 2d (PUR) 540, 1999 WL 667575,
at *1 (Cal. P.U.C. 1999).
74. Id. at *2.
75. Such laws may be implemented to prevent the sale of organs, ensure that organs are
allocated efficiently (to those with the greatest need), and guarantee fair access to a limited
resource. Antonia J. Cronin & James F. Douglas, Directed and Conditional Deceased Donor
Organ Donations: Laws and Misconceptions, 18 MED. L. REV. 275, 276 (2010).
76. Directed donations are now expressly permitted under federal regulations, 42 C.F.R.
§ 121.8(h) (2013), as well as by the versions of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act adopted by
many states, REVISED ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 11(a)(2) (amended 2006), 8A U.L.A. 109
(Supp. 2013); UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 6(a)(3) (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 54 (2003).
77. Until recently, Vermont had such a restriction. Alexandra K. Glazier & Scott
Sasjack, Should It Be Illicit To Solicit? A Legal Analysis of Policy Options To Regulate
Solicitation of Organs for Transplant, 17 HEALTH MATRIX 63, 95 n.165 (2007).
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jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom and France.78 In addition,
anonymity might be a condition of maintaining certain types of private
rights. For example, failure to remain anonymous when pursuing a claim in
court (or other activity that requires disclosure of certain facts about
oneself) might preclude one from bringing an invasion of privacy claim
based on the broadcast of the private facts revealed.79
Finally, it is worth highlighting an anonymity condition that is not
currently imposed but has been proposed. As I discuss in more detail in
Part IV, Ian Ayres, Bruce Ackerman, and Jeremy Bulow have proposed that
we address problems of quid pro quo political corruption by imposing
anonymity on campaign contributions, much like we impose it on voting.80
Under current law, however, we use the opposite type of conditioning rule
to solve this problem—a rule to which I will now turn.
2. Attribution As a Condition
Under federal election law, a variety of modes of supporting a candidate
for office are subject to attribution requirements. A candidate or committee
that receives “an anonymous cash contribution in excess of $50 shall
promptly dispose of the amount over $50.”81 And attribution is required for
all electioneering communications made by any person and for all public
communications made by a person or political committee soliciting
contributions or advocating the election or defeat of a candidate.82
Attribution is also a condition for several types of voting. The votes of
legislators in Congress are public and recorded for posterity.83 The
identities of citizens who “vote” by signing referendum petitions may be
subject to disclosure under state public records acts.84 And except in the
special circumstances noted above and in courts-martial,85 the votes of
jurors (who must themselves be identified) must be attributed when a
polling is requested.86
78. In France, it is a criminal offense to breach this anonymity in either direction. Joan
L. McGregor & Frédérique Dreifuss-Netter, France and the United States: The Legal and
Ethical Differences in Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), 26 MED. & L. 117, 124
(2007); see also Cronin & Douglas, supra note 75, at 275–76 (discussing assisted
reproductive technology in the United Kingdom).
79. Cf. Green v. CBS Broad., Inc., 3:98-CV-2740-T, 2000 WL 33243748, at *11 (N.D.
Tex. Dec. 19, 2000).
80. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 6; Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The
Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity To Disrupt the Market for Political
Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837 (1998).
81. 11 C.F.R. § 110.4 (2013).
82. Id. § 110.11.
83. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 113th Cong., R. III (2013), available at
http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/house-rules.pdf.
84. The Supreme Court has held that such a disclosure requirement does not on its face
violate a citizen’s First Amendment anonymity rights, see Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811,
2821 (2010), but has left open the possibility of an as-applied challenge. See generally
Boudin, supra note 7.
85. On mandatory secret voting in courts-martial, see Stephen A. Lamb, The CourtMartial Panel Selection Process: A Critical Analysis, 137 MIL. L. REV. 103, 127 (1992).
86. See generally Bremer, supra note 72.
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Many other participants in the judicial and criminal justice system must
also be identified. In general, pleadings must include a caption with the
parties’ names,87 actions must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest,88 and witnesses must be identified.89 And the last requirement has
echoes upstream in criminal law. For example, courts have generally held
that an anonymously provided tip to the police cannot by itself give rise to
reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop or probable cause for a search
warrant.90
Attribution is also required for some private law causes of action. For
example, courts have generally held that a person can only have a right of
publicity in a pseudonym if the general public identifies the pseudonym
with that person.91 So under these cases, an author who creates a
pseudonymous blog in which he develops a distinctive, publicly
recognizable persona but without true attribution (i.e., without anyone
knowing his real identity) would not have a claim.92 The same is generally
true for the related claim of misappropriation of name or likeness.93 Note
87. FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a).
88. Id. R. 17(a). In special circumstances, however, parties have a right to anonymity or
pseudonymity. Two broad categories of interests have been considered sufficient to justify
anonymity or pseudonymity: (1) ensuring that claims are advanced or crimes prosecuted,
see, e.g., Doe v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2000); and
(2) protecting privacy interests, especially of victims and children. See, e.g., In re Baby M,
537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). Lior Strahilevitz has proposed radically different criteria,
arguing that the right to proceed pseudonymously should be contingent on factors including
the novelty of the issues presented, the access of the parties to bully pulpits, the parties’ legal
sophistication, the magnitude of their injuries, and the reputational stakes for all those
involved. See generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Pseudonymous Litigation, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
1239 (2010).
89. See Comparet-Cassani, supra note 53, at 1168. This requirement is not absolute, and
it is possible that someone who has been threatened or attacked by a defendant will be given
the right to testify anonymously.
90. Eric C. Surette, Annotation, Sufficiency of Information Provided by Anonymous
Informant To Provide Probable Cause for Federal Search Warrant—Cases Decided After
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), 178 A.L.R. FED.
487, 495 (2002); see also 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 132 (2010).
91. For example, in McFarland v. Miller, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff could
hold a right of publicity in his nickname, “Spanky McFarland,” if he could demonstrate that
the name was “so associated with him as to be indistinguishable from him in public
perception.” McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 914 (3d Cir. 1994). Likewise, in a
fascinating opinion worth brief mention, the Sixth Circuit held that Johnny Carson had a
right of publicity in the name “Here’s Johnny,” explaining that “there was an appropriation
of Carson’s identity without using his ‘name[,]’” and even more noteworthy, that “there
would have been no violation of his right of publicity” if his real name had been used.
Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983) (emphasis
added); see also Ackerman v. Ferry, No. B143751, 2002 WL 31506931, at *18–19 (Cal. Ct.
App. Nov. 12, 2002); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 137 (Wis. 1979).
92. Cf. Eric Etheridge, The Outing of Publius, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2009, 5:09 PM),
opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/08/the-outing-of-publius/?_r=0
(discussing
pseudonymous blogging).
93. See, e.g., Faegre & Benson, LLP v. Purdy, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1248 (D. Minn.
2005) (involving a misappropriation of identity claim against a defendant who had used a
pseudonym associated with the plaintiff on a satirical blog making fun of the plaintiff); see
also McFarland, 14 F.3d at 914 (rejecting a privacy-based claim); Jaggard v. R.H. Macy &
Co., 26 N.Y.S.2d 829, 830 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (explaining that the state statute protecting the

2014]

ANONYMITY

1767

that this rule is the inverse of the one requiring that a fact be anonymous or
unknown to bring a standard invasion of privacy claim94 (from which the
right of publicity and misappropriation of identity torts derived).95
Finally, in a wide variety of private transactions, ranging from
telemarketing to the sale of publicly traded stocks by company insiders,
identity disclosure is required.96
C. Extinguishing Rules
Turning now to the final category of rules, I will survey the ways in
which our law extinguishes rights and capacities on the basis of anonymity
and attribution. As noted earlier, these rules are similar to conditioning
rules in that whenever anonymity or attribution extinguishes a right, it could
be said that the opposite is a condition of having that right. What makes
them different and surprising, however, is the role of adversity. Under
extinguishing rules, a potentially adverse party is able to trigger the loss of
one’s rights by imposing anonymity or attribution.
1. Anonymity As a Trigger
Perhaps the most salient rule where imposed anonymization extinguishes
a right arises in the context of the “Common Rule” regime that governs all
human-subjects research that is conducted, supported, or otherwise subject
to regulation by the federal government.97 In general, this regime requires
informed consent for all research involving human subjects, including
research using the subjects’ biological tissue and associated data.98
However, research is exempt from this requirement if the tissue or data is
de-identified.99 Consequently, anonymization extinguishes a subject’s right
to withhold consent, and allows for research that breaches the limits
imposed by prior consent.100
A similar logic underlies numerous other federal and state statutes and
regulations. For example, a variety of state laws declare that genetic
information is the “unique” or “exclusive” property of the individual to

right of privacy in one’s name does not apply to partnership names, corporate names, or
names adopted for business purposes).
94. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
95. 4 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 740 (2d ed. 2011).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 6102(a)(1) (2012) (telemarketing); see also 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)
(investment advisors to hedge funds).
97. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2013).
98. Id. §§ 46.102(f), 46.116.
99. Id. §§ 46.101(b)(4), 46.102(f).
100. In fact, anonymization has been found to constitute an alternative to providing a
right to withdraw. See, e.g., Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 999 (E.D. Mo.
2006). A similar rule is in place in other countries. See Stefan Eriksson & Gert Helgesson,
Potential Harms, Anonymization, and the Right To Withdraw Consent to Biobank Research,
13 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 1071, 1073–74 (2005).
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whom the information pertains,101 but the laws contain exemptions for
anonymous research where the identity of the individual will not be
released.102 Anonymization likewise defeats one’s rights against disclosure
of personal information under the Freedom of Information Act,103 the
Privacy Act of 1974,104 and the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act.105 Anonymization also appears to generally trump
one’s interests in preventing anonymization.106
Even the imposed ability to be anonymous might defeat some rights or
capacities. For example, in Singleton v. Wulff,107 the Supreme Court
addressed the question of whether a group of doctors had third-party
standing to claim that Medicaid’s exclusion of most abortion services
violated their patients’ constitutional rights.108 The Court held that they
did, in part based on its determination that a woman’s desire to protect her
privacy may deter her from bringing suit herself.109 However, Justice
Lewis Powell, in dissent, argued that the ability of a woman to sue
anonymously under a pseudonym defeated any privacy-based justification
for allowing her interests to be represented by a third party.110 While this
position did not become law, I highlight it to mark out the negative space in
the taxonomy (i.e., the extinguishing rules that might be, but are not), which
is important to recognize but often difficult to see and illustrate.
2. Attribution As a Trigger
Forensic DNA databanks, like research biobanks, are governed by an
extinguishing rule; but here the triggering event is not anonymization, but
rather identification. In a series of cases addressing the question of whether
the unconsented seizure and banking of the DNA of inmates and parolees
violates the Fourth Amendment, federal courts of appeal have adopted an
extinguishing rule in holding that it does not. They have explained that
101. Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper
Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 744 n.27 (2003) (citing
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana statutes).
102. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 192.531–.549 (West 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10:5-43 to -49 (West 2013).
103. ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 85 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that the parties cited
no case “in which a court has found a privacy right to be at risk where identifying
information has been adequately redacted”).
104. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)–(12) (2012).
105. De-identified data is not included in the privacy rule’s definition of “protected health
information.” M. B. Kapp, Ethical and Legal Issues in Research Involving Human Subjects:
Do You Want a Piece of Me?, 59 J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 335, 338 (2006).
106. However, one court to address the issue with respect to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
has suggested that one might have an interest in preventing anonymization, explaining that
“whether there is a privacy interest in the release of a set of aggregate data is a different
question from whether consumers have a privacy interest in the initial use of their nonpublic
personal information for the creation of aggregate data.” Individual Reference Servs. Grp.,
Inc. v. FTC, 145 F. Supp. 2d 6, 38 (D.D.C. 2001).
107. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
108. Id. at 108.
109. Id. at 108, 117.
110. Id. at 126 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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because the identities of these people are already known to the state as
actual or potential criminal offenders, they have no right of privacy in their
identities, and therefore no right of privacy in the identifying information
derived from banking their DNA.111
While the law is unclear, it is possible that sperm donors’ rights not to be
the legal parents of the children produced with their sperm are also subject
to this type of extinguishing rule. No court has directly addressed this
possibility, but they have addressed the opposite sides of the relevant issues
in discussing a related conditioning rule. In C.O. v. W.S.,112 for example,
an Ohio court addressed the question of whether a plaintiff who had
donated sperm to a lesbian couple, on the understanding that he could be
involved in the child’s life, could assert legal paternity over the child when
the mother attempted to end his involvement on the basis of Ohio’s
nonspousal artificial insemination statute.113 The court held that the
“complete circumvention by the donor and recipient of the critical element
of anonymity” negated the mother’s “attempts to cloak her pregnancy under
the ambit of the non-spousal artificial insemination law,” and thus the donor
was a legal parent of the child.114 While this holding leaves open the
question of whether the court would also have ruled the same way if the
positions were reversed (i.e., if a donor were claiming a right to not be a
legal parent) or if attribution was not consensual, the court’s logic suggests
that entangling the donor in the life of a child could extinguish his right to
not be a legal parent should he try to claim it.
* * *
To summarize, what the above analysis shows is that across nearly every
area of law anonymity and attribution rules are being used to facilitate and
control the production of goods, and that they are doing so in ways that
have not before been recognized. This raises the question of whether there
is any coherence to our uses of these rules—of why we have them, what
functions they perform, and how they operate. It is to these questions that I
turn in the next Part. Before doing so, however, I offer a table that briefly
summarizes the six core types of rules that I have identified and some of the
situations in which they often apply, stated simply and without the many
qualifications and limitations identified above:

111. See, e.g., United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 837 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he DNA
profile derived from the defendant’s blood sample establishes only a record of the
defendant’s identity . . . in which the qualified offender can claim no right of privacy.”); see
also United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 680 (6th Cir. 2006) (same); Jones v. Murray,
962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992).
112. 639 N.E.2d 523 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994).
113. Id. at 524.
114. Id. at 525. Many other courts have also taken non-anonymity to be a relevant
consideration. See, e.g., In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 33–35 (Colo. 1989); Thomas S. v. Robin
Y., 209 A.D.2d 298, 306 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 241
(Or. Ct. App. 1989); Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1250 (Pa. 2007) (Eakin, J.,
dissenting).

Extinguishing Rules

Conditioning Rules

Entitlement Rules
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Anonymity
There are rules that grant anonymity
rights when:

Attribution
There are rules that grant attribution
rights when:



creating a contract using an agent





purchasing specified products

creating artwork with certain
characteristics



donating sperm for in vitro
fertilization



creating copyrighted works in
some circumstances†



creating artwork with certain
characteristics



giving birth to children



engaging in free speech



providing information as part of state
and federal bounty schemes and
witness protection programs



participating in the judicial system (as
a party, witness, or juror) in special
circumstances

There are rules that make anonymity a
condition of:

There are rules that make attribution a
condition of:



voting in a general election



donating money to a politician



serving as a grand juror or regular
juror in special circumstances



engaging in various forms of
speech related to elections



engaging in market transactions in
heavily regulated industries



voting as an elected official





signing a legislative petition

maintaining a tort claim for invasion
of privacy





participating in the judicial system
(as a party, witness, or juror)

donating an organ†



providing a tip to the police that
itself constitutes probable cause



having a tort claim for
misappropriation of identity



engaging in various regulated
private market transactions

There are rules under which anonymity
extinguishes rights to:

There are rules under which
attribution extinguishes rights to:



limit research using one’s biological
tissue and data through informed
consent requirements



prevent the government from
seizing one’s genetic material for
use in forensic DNA databanks



prevent the disclosure and use of
personal information otherwise
protected by privacy laws



avoid being a legal parent by
virtue of being a sperm donor†



challenge the unconsented
anonymization of personal data

† This is a case in which the rule is unclear or unusual.
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II. THEORY OF PRODUCTION
Having proposed and populated a taxonomy of anonymity and attribution
rules that have not previously been identified or categorized as such, I will
in this Part explore why we have these rules, what functions they perform,
and whether there is coherence across disparate domains of law. My central
argument is that these rules do perform a cohesive set of functions, which I
identify and explain with a theory of production.
In developing this theory, I differentiate between three phases in the
production of goods—between three types of actions that our law might
seek to incentivize or control. First, there are actions that make a good
available to members of the public for the first time, which I refer to as the
“creation” phase of production. Examples of this could include writing a
pamphlet that conveys information about political candidates or donating
tissue for use at a research university. Second, there are actions that
interpret or draw inferences from a good, which I refer to as the
“evaluation” phase. Continuing with my previous examples, this could
include judging the truthfulness of information contained in the political
pamphlet and drawing conclusions from the data contained in the tissue
sample. Third, there are actions that alter who possesses and controls the
use of a good, which I will refer to as the “allocation” phase. This could
include allowing a reader of the pamphlet to use it in an unintended way
and allowing a university to distribute a tissue sample beyond the scope of
the donor’s consent.
Using this framing of “production,” I demonstrate that across each of
these three phases—creation, evaluation, and allocation—the seemingly
opposite anonymity and attribution versions of each category of rule serve
common functions. Specifically, I argue they both shape the costs and
benefits of creating goods in order to align private production incentives
with public goals and values, control information flows in order to address
evaluation costs associated with using goods, and reallocate rights of
control over goods in order to achieve their efficient or fair allocation. In
identifying these functions, I do not take a position on whether they justify
our law as a normative matter. Rather, I advance a descriptive and
explanatory argument about how the rules work in order to better
understand the functions that they perform in our law.115
A. Creation
The first phase of production is the creation of the good—the actions that
make the good available to members of the public for the first time. In
exploring the functions that anonymity and attribution rules perform here, I
will argue that both provide a way of altering the internalization and
externalization of the costs and benefits of creation in order to align private
production incentives with public goals and values. These goals and values
115. In doing so, however, I implicitly reveal a set of previously unrecognized design
levers that can be used to develop innovative solutions to difficult problems of production,
which I demonstrate in Part III.
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may include welfare maximization, in which case the rules would be used
to force the complete internalization of these costs and benefits (or an
outcome-equivalent allocation);116 or distributional fairness, in which case
the rules would be used to achieve an alternate allocation. The substance of
these goals, however, is not my focus. Rather, I am interested in how these
goals are achieved by entitlement rules and conditioning rules.117 What I
show is that each modifies production incentives in a different way:
entitlement rules create incentives by allowing the entitlement holder to
alter the costs and benefits of creating a good, whereas conditioning rules
control incentives by either preventing or allowing public rewards and
sanctions.118 In advancing this argument, I focus on how the rules modify
external incentives, and how they impact those whose identity is at issue,
setting aside the further questions of how anonymity might function as an
intrinsic incentive, and how one might be impacted by the anonymity of a
third party.119
1. Autonomous Creation
Entitlement rules allow a private party, the entitlement holder, to alter the
allocation of the costs and benefits of creating a good, thereby incentivizing
autonomous creation in one of two ways.
First, the rules allow the entitlement holder to internalize some of the
benefits of a good that would, without the rights, be externalized—an
intervention that is particularly important when the creation of a desired
good will involve many internalized costs. Take, for example, a copper
company that, through extensive investments in aerial surveys, discovers

116. This may or may not involve actually achieving complete internalization of costs and
benefits, as the result could be achieved with imperfect internalization of both.
117. Extinguishing rules might also impact creation, but this seems to often be an
unintended side effect. See infra Part II.C.
118. In allocating the costs and benefits of creation, both entitlement and conditioning
rules generally act on private, decentralized incentive structures, and this is central to a
subsidiary function: encouraging or controlling the creation of goods efficiently. This
function can be clearly seen in the case of anonymity and attribution rights, where efficiency
is achieved by cheaply removing factors that would disrupt an actor’s private incentives to
create a good. The right to anonymous speech, for example, is cheaper and easier to
administer than many other ways of deterring or punishing retaliation against actors who
would, absent retaliation, provide socially useful speech (and may also be more normatively
desirable than trying to make illegal all forms of potential retaliation). On this efficiency
rationale, the case for granting an anonymity right is stronger when the sanctions are legal
and difficult to prevent (as is the case with many social sanctions) and weaker when the
sanctions are illegal and easy to detect. The same is true of anonymity and attribution
conditions. The requirement that campaign contributions be publicly attributed, for example,
allows the public (rather than the government alone) to police corruption, placing the issue in
the hands of voters who can hold representatives and donors accountable for any money
trails that they do not like. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67–68 (1976) (per curiam).
Likewise, requiring that votes be anonymous may be cheaper than other forms of public
oversight to prevent corruption in elections. In these ways, entitlement and conditioning
rules can be seen as quasi-private solutions to public goods problems.
119. For example, third-party anonymity might allow for anonymous retribution that
would impact one’s decision to publicly circulate a good.
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copper deposits in land that it does not own.120 If the copper company did
not have the ability to buy this land anonymously or pseudonymously
through an agent, the benefit of its investments might become externalized:
the seller of the land might infer that there are copper deposits on the land
and thus raise his price significantly. Ex ante, such a rule would not only
strip nonowners—those with expertise—of an incentive to invest in
developing information about others’ property, but also reduce owners’
incentives to correctly identify the attributes of their own property by giving
them the possibility of free riding on the work of the experts.121 Thus,
granting a right of anonymity helps ensure that both owners and potential
buyers of property have incentives to invest, thereby increasing the
likelihood that the full value of the property will materialize. In addition,
the anonymity right helps solve a related externalities problem that arises
when a prospective buyer is trying to assemble and redevelop land held by
many parties.122 By helping hide this fact from the sellers, the anonymity
right helps solve a strategic holdout problem that would reduce the
developer’s incentives to invest in a project that would benefit all of the
parties.123
Second, entitlement rules encourage autonomous creation by allowing a
party to externalize some of the costs of a good that would, without the
rights, be internalized. This function is particularly important to properly
aligning incentives when the party will not be able to internalize all the
external benefits. Take, for example, a whistleblower who provides
information about a company that results in harm to that company. In
general, she will not receive many of the benefits of the information she
provides. However, if she does not have the ability to provide the
information anonymously, the company will be able to impose sanctions on
her.124 Ex ante, such a rule would disincentivize whistleblowers from
providing damaging information, even if it were socially desirable. An
anonymity right solves this by allowing the whistleblower to reallocate the
costs of creation: it allows her to avoid internalizing the cost of sanctions,
forcing the company to bear the costs that derive from its inability to
prevent the circulation of the information that she provides, in order to
serve a broader public good.125

120. Cf. Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of
Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 20–21 (1978).
121. Id. at 16.
122. Kelly, supra note 19, at 18–25.
123. Id.; see also Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907,
928–29 (2004) (discussing externalities created by holdouts).
124. In other cases, the costs of production addressed by anonymity rules might include
reputational harm (such as ostracism for breaching a social norm or shame when a sensitive
condition is revealed), damage to relationships (such as when one’s action betrays or
disappoints friends or family), exposure to demands for further action (such as when one
provides a good or service for which others then want more and various further costs if one
fails to comply with the demands), and loss of ability to perform certain roles.
125. Following a similar logic, we might limit rights of anonymity to discourage acts for
which the actor would receive third-party sanctions. For example, as discussed in the

1774

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

In these two ways, entitlement rules may generally be expected to cause
an increase in the production of the given good to which they apply.126 It is
important to note, however, that there will be exceptions to this, as the rules
do not merely allocate existing costs and benefits, but can also create new
ones. For simplicity, I will continue to focus on the anonymity side of the
story, but the same lesson applies to attribution. There are three
possibilities worth flagging. The first is that the creation of an anonymity
right will cause a decrease in production, causing someone who would have
produced a good to no longer do so—for example, by changing the meaning
of production in a way that “crowds out” the original motivating
incentive.127 Second, the creation of the right may not cause an increase in
production, but rather a shift from attributed to anonymous production—an
outcome that can be expected for those who were previously willing to act
openly, but would have preferred to act anonymously. When this occurs,
the production gains from granting the anonymity right will need to be
discounted by the value, if any, of this lost identity information. At the
same time, however, the creation of an anonymity right may create new
incentives for attributed production—an outcome that is most likely when
most parties choose to exercise their anonymity rights, making some
recipients willing to pay a premium for attributed goods.128 In this case, the
discount in the second scenario must be reversed accordingly. Thus, casespecific evaluations of potential feedback effects must always accompany
the use of these rules.
2. Controlled Creation
While entitlement rules allow private parties to choose if and how an
external incentive will shape their creation of a good, conditioning rules
limit their autonomy in this regard. They control creation by serving as a
gatekeeper, either allowing or preventing feedback such as public rewards
and sanctions.

taxonomy, the law allows for the de-anonymization of persons sued for defamation. See
supra note 49 and accompanying text.
126. While I have focused on the anonymity side of the story for the sake of simplicity,
the same can be said of attribution. For example, the right of attribution allows parties to
capitalize on investment in their reputations, which also play a crucial role in the efficient
operation of markets. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 618–20 (1984). On the reward functions of
attribution generally, see Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It’s Due: The Law and Norms of
Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J. 49, 53–60 (2006).
127. For example, allowing people to donate to charity anonymously might reduce the
benefits of open donation by making it appear self-serving. On “motivation crowding,” see
Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing As a
Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 321–28 (2004) (providing a critical
overview of the literature), and Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory,
15 J. ECON. SURVEYS 589 (2001).
128. We see something like this with the “true name” and “real name” cultures of some
online communities. See Lisa P. Ramsey, Brandjacking on Social Networks: Trademark
Infringement by Impersonation of Markholders, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 851, 863–64 (2010).

2014]

ANONYMITY

1775

Anonymity conditions, for example, are useful when we think that the
possibility of feedback will allocate the costs and benefits of the good in a
way that undermines its public value. For example, in general elections,
anonymity is generally required to ensure that a voter will not be
accountable to anyone but himself for the content of his vote. By making it
impossible for third parties to verify the content of one’s vote ex post, the
anonymity requirement makes it unlikely that someone would devote
resources to trying to buy or coerce votes, or that a voter would succumb to
coercion or be able to find a buyer for his vote. Thus, anonymity prevents
the voter and the potential vote buyer from reallocating the costs and
benefits of voting (transferring some of the benefit that the vote provides to
the candidate back to the voter) in a way that is against the public interest.
A similar logic can justify requiring anonymity for organ donations,
campaign contributions, jurors (in the special circumstances identified
above), and grand jurors.129 Although not always framed in these terms,
these examples can be seen—following the logic of the taxonomy—as
cases in which anonymity is useful as a way of preventing the relevant
actors from being improperly influenced by undesirable feedback.
Conversely, attribution conditions are useful when we think that the
possibility of rewards or sanctions will allocate the costs and benefits in a
way that is desirable—when allowing unaccountable anonymous creation
will be harmful. For example, the right of anonymous speech is revoked,
and attribution is imposed, when a speaker engages in defamation.130 By
creating the possibility for accountability and sanctions ex post, the
attribution rule leads to self-regulation ex ante in which the social costs are
in effect internalized into creation decisions. The same is true of the
attribution requirements for legislative votes, campaign donations, and juror
votes: the requirements make it less likely that a legislator will sell her
vote, that a donor will give (or political candidate accept) money motivated
by illicit purposes, or that a juror will go along with the majority but then
secretly vote with the minority.131
In these two ways, anonymity and attribution conditions limit the
autonomy of the actor creating the good—and this is what I take to be their
core function. However, it is important to briefly note that imposing
anonymity or attribution can actually incentivize production that might not

129. The grand jury, for example, is “meant to operate in secrecy and to be
unaccountable—if not to the community, then certainly to the governmental structure.
Indeed, these features of the American grand jury were part of its original design.” Fairfax,
supra note 71, at 749 (emphasis added).
130. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
131. When the members of a jury know that their votes will not be identified, anonymity
may be the source of suboptimal deliberation, as a juror may pretend to go along with the
majority to avoid lengthy discussion but then secretly vote with the minority. Jon Elster,
Publicity and Secrecy in Jury Proceedings 16 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.college-de-france.fr/media/jon-elster/UPL31840_Elster_PUBLICITY_AND_
SECRECY_IN__JURIES_bis.pdf; see also Gardner, supra note 11, at 932; Adrian
Vermeule, Open-Secret Voting 6–7 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 10-37, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1646435.
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occur under a regime that merely allows them, and thus they might be
autonomy enhancing in a limited set of cases. There are a few ways in
which this might occur. One possibility is that the mandatory regime will
“ambiguate” the meaning of an act in the ways identified by Lawrence
Lessig, thereby providing the actor with a legal excuse for an action that he
prefers but for which he would have faced social costs.132 For example, a
switch from optional to required anonymity for voting allows those who
want to vote anonymously to do so without sending any negative social
signals (for example, that the voter is trying to hide something or that he
fears vote coercion by his friends).133 Another way in which removing
choice might satisfy an actor’s preferences is by changing the entire playing
field in a way that alters the impact of an anonymous or attributed action.
For example, as Ayres and Bulow have argued, mandating anonymity for
campaign donations can be expected to cause a decrease in large donations,
making small donors relatively more important and more likely to
donate.134 Thus, although imposing anonymity or attribution might restrict
choice in a way that discourages participation by some,135 it may encourage
participation by others by virtue of its impact on existing incentives. For
this reason, the use of conditioning rules—like the use of entitlement
rules—must always be done with attention to their possible secondary
impacts.
B. Evaluation
The second phase of production is evaluation—the acts of interpretation
or judgment that accompany the use of goods that have been created. As
noted above, examples of this could include judging the truthfulness of
information contained in a political pamphlet or drawing conclusions from
the data contained in a tissue sample. And, as with the creation phase,
anonymity and attribution rules again perform common functions that I
identify. In particular, my analysis focuses on their use as conditions and
rights.136 I argue that these rules can be used to either reduce inefficiencies

132. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 952
(1995) (noting that the meaning conveyed by buckling a seatbelt in a Budapest taxi, where
no seatbelt is required by law, may signal mistrust of the driver, but that a similar action in a
city with a seatbelt requirement may convey no meaning or, at most, signal that the occupant
is law abiding); id. at 1010–12 (discussing “ambiguation” and its utility).
133. Likewise, requiring that charitable donations be identified ambiguates the meaning
of attributed donation. It provides an excuse for someone who likes donating in order to
receive praise, but who would feel social pressure to donate anonymously—and thus not
donate—if attribution were not required.
134. Ayres & Bulow, supra note 80, at 851.
135. For example, the secret ballot is “estimated to have decreased voter turnout by about
12 percent.” ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 6, at 30.
136. While extinguishing rules will also impact the evaluation of the anonymized or
identified good, evaluation-oriented concerns will not generally provide a rationale for
choosing an extinguishing rule over an entitlement or conditioning rule. Further, within
these two categories, evaluation may often be better served by conditioning rules, as they
have an institutional rulemaker—rather than a private party—deciding whether the good at
issue will be anonymous or attributed. And unlike incentives to create, evaluation does not
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in evaluation or to control the factors that enter into evaluation based on a
normative conception of the good at issue. Furthermore, I show that in
performing these functions, the rules sometimes target the evaluation of the
good itself and sometimes its source or recipient. In both cases, a central
rationale for the rules derives from their impact not on the persons who are
subject to them (as is the case with the creation-oriented rationales) but
rather on the parties with whom these persons interact. The rules function
by either preventing or allowing these parties to alter their behavior on the
basis of the identity of the persons who are subject to the rules.
Recognizing this reveals that the primary target of the rules is not always
incentives.
1. Evaluating the Good Itself
My argument that anonymity can improve evaluation may appear
controversial at first, as it is often expressly rejected in the scholarship on
anonymity, which generally suggests that attribution is preferable ex
post.137 But a few examples reveal that the point is in fact quite intuitive.
Take, for example, the question of whether the sponsors of a political
ballot initiative should be attributed. It is often suggested that they should
on the grounds that this disclosure will help voters identify the interests that
the initiative will truly serve.138 However, if the sponsor’s identity will be
misleading (for example, if its name suggests that it is a community-based
environmental group, but it is in fact an industry shell group), requiring
anonymity might facilitate more accurate evaluation than attribution.
Likewise, a pseudonym that protects the anonymity of the source can
reduce evaluation costs in certain circumstances. Take, for example, an
author who writes multiple works under the same pseudonym, develops a
large following, and then licenses the pseudonym to another person or
group of persons who continue to write works of indistinguishable style and
quality—for example, Tom Clancy and V.C. Andrews.139 While many
scholars suggest that such uses of pseudonymity are deceptive and do not
produce the same public benefits as attribution rights,140 Rachel Tushnet
has rejected this conventional claim, noting that “information that is

generally benefit from leaving the decision in the hands of a private party. But of course,
there will be exceptions. For example, if the private party has the desire and competency to
facilitate accurate evaluation, as well as specialized knowledge of the good at issue, an
entitlement rule might be preferable because it would allow the party to make more
individualized and accurate decisions about whether the good should be attributed or
anonymous.
137. E.g., Margaret Ann Wilkinson, The Public Interest in Moral Rights Protection, 2006
MICH. ST. L. REV. 193, 231.
138. Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign
Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 299–300 (2005).
139. See Tushnet, supra note 57, at 813.
140. E.g., Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171,
1227 (2005); Diana Elzey Pinover, The Rights of Authors, Artists, and Performers Under
Section 43(A) of the Lanham Act, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 38, 41 (1993).
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confusing and even deceptive to some people is helpful to others.”141 She
notes that insofar as a reader is looking to read a work in the style and
quality of that author, the pseudonym will provide a valuable signal that
allows the reader to efficiently find a book that she will like, much like a
brand; and this can be the case whether or not the pseudonym is misleading
as to the author’s true identity.142 In fact, stating the truth—that the book is
written by author B in a style and quality indistinguishable from author A—
may result in an inefficient search, as the reader may not trust the claim or
devote resources to trying to verify it, even if it is certified by author A. In
this type of case, it will be precisely because pseudonymity is deceptive in
one sense that it will be able to perform the same valuable search function
that true attribution often performs.
Finally, the evaluation value of anonymity is not limited to cases of
deception. The more general lesson here is that whenever the recipient or
user of a good will be biased in favor or against its source, such that the
source’s identity will be a misleading signal, a regime in which the source
is allowed or required to be anonymous will facilitate accurate
evaluation.143 This is one reason that academic journals conduct blind peer
review of submissions, law schools use anonymous grading of exams, and
symphony orchestras audition candidates by having them play behind a
screen.144 Another reason is that identity is generally considered to be a
normatively objectionable factor to consider when evaluating these goods,
even if it would increase efficiency.
Of course, as the literature on anonymity often highlights,145 there can
also be significant evaluation costs created by anonymity. The most
obvious are cases in which anonymity is misleading in ways that increase
search costs. In the case of authorial attribution discussed above, for
example, if a fan of V.C. Andrews did not like the novels being written by
her anonymous ghostwriters, their anonymity would increase the fan’s
search costs. In addition, there are all the cases in which anonymity is not
misleading, but in which attribution serves a positive evaluation function.
The ways in which attribution—as an entitlement or a condition—can
reduce evaluation costs are more readily apparent and have been identified
in various areas of scholarship. Intellectual property again provides an
illustrative example. Here, a growing literature focuses on a consumeroriented rationale for authorial attribution rights, treating authorship as a
type of trademark that allows readers to more easily identify the types of
141. Tushnet, supra note 57, at 813.
142. Id. at 813–14.
143. Concern with preventing bias also provides a reason to not grant attribution rights.
144. On the implementation of anonymity in orchestra auditions over the 1970s and
1980s, see Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of
“Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 738 (2000) (finding that
women were 50 percent more likely to advance to the second round in blind than in nonblind
auditions).
145. See, e.g., Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 7, at 1559–63; Sophia Qasir, Note, Anonymity
in Cyberspace: Judicial and Legislative Regulations, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3651, 3672
(2013).
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works in which they would prefer to invest their time, attention, and
money.146 This informational function in the context of search is especially
important for experience goods, “where consumers cannot discern the
attributes of products before purchasing them, and must rely on prior
experience in deciding among competing brands.”147 And when the
producer of the good does not want to provide such information, it might be
required. For example, imposing attribution requirements on campaign
advertisements allows the public to use the advocate’s identity when
evaluating the content of the claims in the advertisements.148 In these cases
in which attribution facilitates evaluation, anonymity will disrupt it, and
vice versa.149
2. Evaluating the Source or Recipient of the Good
While the evaluation costs addressed by anonymity and attribution rules
often concern the good that is subject to the rule itself, this is not their only
function. For example, the reason to impose anonymity on a public utility
company’s market transactions in futures and options is not to facilitate the
accurate evaluation of the transactions themselves, but rather to prevent
information asymmetries that would allow for other evaluations that would
disrupt the efficiency of the market.150 Likewise, in the campaign donation
context, a core function of the attribution condition is not facilitating the
evaluation of the attributed good (the donation), but rather the candidate
who receives it. As explained by the Supreme Court in upholding this
condition, the rule “allows voters to place each candidate in the political
spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party
labels and campaign speeches,” and “alert[s] the voter to the interests to
which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate
predictions of future performance in office.”151 In addition, the attribution
condition assists voters in evaluating whether candidates have altered their
policy positions in return for contributions—a function that is performed by
monetary disclosure conditions in other contexts, as well. For example,
most academic biomedical journals require that the sources of funding for a
study be identified as a condition of publication, thereby allowing readers to

146. E.g., Fisk, supra note 126, at 64 (discussing the branding function of attribution).
See generally Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity,
and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377 (2005); Lastowka, supra note 140.
147. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 45
(2002).
148. As with anonymity, however, there are situations in which attribution will not reduce
evaluation costs and might even be affirmatively misleading, such as when a speaker trades
on his identity to gain the trust of his audience and then deceives them.
149. In this sense, the evaluation functions of anonymity and attribution diverge from
their creation functions, where both anonymity and attribution can serve the same specific
function in the same context by acting on different margins of the same problem.
150. See In re Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 85 Cal. Pub. Util. Rep. 2d (PUR) 540, 1999 WL
667575, at *1 (Cal. P.U.C. 1999).
151. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam).
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discount the study’s claims according to their understanding of the potential
bias created by any financial conflicts of interest.152
C. Allocation
The third and final phase of production is the allocation of goods—the
determination of who has the right to possess and control their use after
they have been created and evaluated. My argument here is that anonymity
and attribution rules provide a way of achieving the efficient or fair
allocation of a good when its anonymization or attribution alters the
rationale for the default rights of control over it. In developing this
argument, I first discuss how the rules can be used to produce efficient
allocation (a goal that is targeted primarily by extinguishing rules), and I
then discuss how they can be used to achieve fair allocation (a goal targeted
by both extinguishing and conditioning rules).153 In performing these
functions, the rules can be seen as similar to liability rules,154 as well as a
variety of contract and property doctrines,155 which I draw on in explaining
how they work. More generally, what my analysis shows is that these uses
of anonymity and attribution cannot be sufficiently explained in terms of
their impact on behavior and incentives ex ante, as it might seem from the

152. For example, nearly 1,000 journals follow the International Committee of Medical
Journal Editors’ Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals,
which require that all authors who are participants in the peer review and publication process
disclose all relationships that could be perceived as a conflict of interest. Uniform
Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals: Conflicts of Interest,
INT’L COMM. MED. J. EDITORS, http://www.icmje.org/ethical_4conflicts.html (last visited
Feb. 24, 2014).
153. While I suggest that allocation is primarily targeted by extinguishing and
conditioning rules, entitlement rules can also impact allocation. For example, the attribution
of a monetary donation may cause the recipient to reject it.
154. For example, like liability rules, which allow an adverse party to purchase an
entitlement by paying damages, see Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089
(1972), extinguishing rules allow an adverse party to defeat an entitlement by causing the
triggering event; like liability rules, they provide flexibility that is not afforded by property
rule protection alone. Of course, a significant difference is that liability rules involve
judicial intervention, whereas these extinguishing rules do not.
155. For example, as I highlight in footnotes below, there are similarities with the loss of
contract rights through the doctrines of frustration of purpose, impracticability, or
impossibility; the loss of in rem rights through the doctrines of changed conditions for
servitudes, and adverse possession for real property; and the loss of intellectual property
rights through the doctrine of genericism for trademark, and fair-use for copyright. See infra
notes 160, 169–71, 174. One might distinguish the contract doctrines on the grounds that the
extinguishing rules I have identified defeat entitlements provided by common law, statute,
and regulation. The normative significance of this difference is debatable. Some scholars
would argue that extinguishing property rights is more problematic than extinguishing
contract rights, because parties can always contract around the extinguishing rule, even if it
means using less efficient alternative measures to secure their reliance interests. Cf. Glen O.
Robinson, Explaining Contingent Rights: The Puzzle of “Obsolete” Covenants, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 546, 573 (1991). But one might also conclude that this difference makes the
extinguishing rules less problematic, as they do not interfere with freedom to contract, but
rather with the grant of entitlements to which one has no absolute moral or legal claim in the
first instance.
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viewpoint of information economics. Rather, in the cases that I discuss,
they must be understood as serving allocational goals ex post.156
Understanding the complex ways in which they do so is crucial to
understanding one of the most surprising and difficult-to-explain categories
of rules in the taxonomy: extinguishing rules (i.e., rules that take away
someone’s rights when anonymity or attribution is imposed by others).
1. Efficient Allocation
The goal of efficient allocation is served by extinguishing rules when a
triggering event—anonymization or identification—changes the interests of
the anonymous or identified party such that the allocation of a right to that
person becomes economically inefficient, and market obstacles will prevent
the efficient reallocation of a good controlled by that right.157 To illustrate
the complex ways in which the rules perform this function, my analysis
focuses on one controversial rule that does so: the rule that allows a
researcher to extinguish a tissue donor’s right to limit the use of his tissue in
research—and even breach the express terms of his consent—merely by
anonymizing the tissue. Analyzing the functions performed by this specific
rule not only clarifies the allocational functions performed by anonymity
and attribution rules in general (which is my goal in this Part) but also
creates the foundation for my discussion of how this specific rule could be
improved (which I discuss in depth in Part III.A.2).
The first obstacle to efficient allocation that can be solved with
extinguishing rules is market organization costs.158 These costs—which
include identifying the parties who own an entitlement and structuring an
effective exchange relationship with them—are one standard cause of
market failure identified in the law and economics literature. The factors
that contribute to these costs include nonpossessory property rights that are
hard to identify, unforeseeable circumstances that are difficult to
incorporate into initial rounds of contracting, and the existence of multiple
parties.
Many of the factors that contribute to market organization costs are
present in the default situations addressed by the extinguishing rules that I
identified, including tissue donors’ default rights to limit the use of their
tissue in research no matter who possesses it. In this case, the tissue donors
are provided a nonpossessory right of control over their tissue samples;
156. While information economics is primarily concerned with how information can be
regulated to alter behavior (e.g., transactions), I take this to be a function of some but not all
anonymity and attribution rules. For example, the rules that I characterized as targeting the
creation of goods ex ante, such as whistleblower statutes, are primarily concerned with
altering incentives and behavior of the parties impacted by the rule. But the rules that I
discuss in this section target allocation ex post; and here, anonymization and attribution may
merely provide a justification for reallocation of goods by other means.
157. I will focus on two types of obstacles: market organization costs and strategic
bargaining. For an overview of these and other types of transaction costs that do not seem to
be a driving force here, such as exclusion costs, see Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase
and Against “Coaseanism,” 99 YALE L.J. 611, 614–16 (1989).
158. See id.
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these samples will be used in research that will likely extend beyond the
donors’ lifespans, it is often impossible to anticipate in advance what
research studies will evolve, and a single project might use the tissue of
thousands of donors. Thus, the default requirement that a researcher obtain
specific consent for new uses of the tissue can impose significant market
organization costs that will hinder biomedical research.
Further, while the expenditure of these costs might be economically
efficient when the samples are identified, as the donors may have valuable
privacy interests at stake, anonymization could change this balance.
Imagine, for example, that the donors place little value on limiting the use
of their tissue postanonymization as they are no longer worried about their
privacy. If so, it is likely that the costs of obtaining specific consent will be
greater than the value produced by the transaction—especially when the
experiment is of minimal or uncertain value, as is often the case with
research on a single tissue sample. Under these conditions, where the cost
of exchange is high and its benefit to the parties is small,159 the
extinguishing rule currently in use (which eliminates the consent
requirement on the basis of anonymization) would benefit one party with
minimal or no harm to the other.160 In this way, it would produce the
economically efficient allocation of rights and tissue.
The second cause of inefficient allocation that can be addressed by
extinguishing rules is strategic bargaining.161 In the tissue context, at least
three types of strategic behavior could be expected to prevent the efficient
reallocation of rights of control after anonymization (assuming—as I
discussed above—that anonymization makes the default allocation
inefficient by reducing the value that donors place on their rights of
control). First, there is the possibility of “strategic holdout” by the donor
who has a veto power over the research.162 This could happen when there
is only one donor, but becomes increasingly likely when the agreement of
multiple donors is needed (such as when a researcher needs a complete set
of tissue samples), as the opportunity costs of holding out decrease with an
increase in the number of parties.163 Second, even if a researcher needs
only one sample, barriers associated with monopoly or bilateral monopoly
conditions could arise given the uniqueness of tissue and genetic data—a
problem aggravated by the fact that the tissue will often be far more
159. In fact, for all the donors who would not object to research on their anonymized
tissue, the requirement of re-consent produces transaction costs but produces no benefit.
160. A similar logic is one of the justifications for the fair-use doctrine in copyright, see
Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1211
(1996), the changed conditions doctrine for covenants, see Susan F. French, Toward a
Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1280–
81 (1982), and the privileges of private and public necessity in tort, see Bell &
Parchomovsky, supra note 147, at 51 n.180.
161. On the strategic bargaining problem as a basis for limits on consensual rules
allocating land rights, see Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 55, 69–74 (1987). See generally Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD.
1, 14–29 (1982).
162. Robinson, supra note 155, at 571–72.
163. Id. at 572–73 (noting that there is less to gain from equal sharing of the surplus).
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valuable to the researcher than to the donor.164 Third, rent seeking by the
tissue source could prevent efficient allocation if the researcher has invested
significant time and energy into research using a collection of tissues in a
biobank but has not yet completed his research; here, the time and energy
would become a quasi-rent that a tissue source could try to extract, in
addition to the value of his tissue, through threat of withdrawing consent.165
By working around these three core obstacles to bargaining that have been
identified in law and economics literature, the extinguishing rule can
achieve the efficient allocation of the tissue and the rights of control over it.
At this point, I should perhaps reiterate that my argument here is not that
this extinguishing rule—or any other rule that I have identified—is in fact
justified because it serves the functions that I have theorized. Rather, my
focus on the rule is illustrative, and my argument throughout this Part is
explanatory. Here, my claim is just that when anonymization or attribution
of a good makes the allocation of a right of control over the good inefficient
by reducing the value of the right to the entitlement holder whose identity is
at issue, extinguishing rules may work around various types of market
failures (market organization and strategic bargaining) to achieve the
economically efficient reallocation of the good.
However, I must also highlight at this point that my analysis thus far has
assumed an ex post perspective (i.e., I have discussed how the rule would
work when applied to an existing scenario), and that there are two limiting
situations in which the ex ante effects of extinguishing rules (i.e., the effects
going forward) might reverse some of this benefit and produce inefficient
allocation.
First, perhaps the most significant possibility of this problem arises when
the party that will benefit from the extinguishing rule is able to control the
conditions that trigger it—as is the case in the tissue example, where the
researcher can either obtain consent or anonymize. The problem here is
that the rules reward the researcher who deliberately bypasses the
opportunity to bargain in a “thick market” with the tissue source and who
instead knowingly acts in a way that creates the “thin market” situation that
justifies the operation of the rule.166 This not only increases the possibility
164. The reason is that the larger the surplus, the greater the gain from obtaining the
larger share. James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The
Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 461 (1995). On the problem of bilateral
monopoly, see Gregg P. Macey, Coasean Blind Spots: Charting the Incomplete
Institutionalism, 98 GEO. L.J. 863, 903 (2010). The problem of bilateral monopoly justifies
“most of the land law rules that depart from the geometric-box allocation.” Sterk, supra note
160, at 58.
165. The researcher would thus find himself in the same situation as an adverse possessor
who has improved a property on the expectation that he will be able to continue using it, but
is then confronted by the true owner who can demand more than market value for the
property. On the use of adverse possession doctrine to solve this problem, see Merrill, supra
note 29, at 1131. But see id. at 1152–54 (critiquing this rationale). On rent seeking
generally, see Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978).
166. By “thin market,” I mean a market in which the conditions allow the seller to extract
economic rents from the buyer, while a “thick market” is one in which the conditions do not
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that the allocation of tissue rights produced by the rules will be inefficient,
but also raises concerns about the fairness of the rules—a topic to which I
return below.167
Second, if we were to think that a source of a tissue sample would value
control more than the researcher, consideration of market organization costs
might weigh against the extinguishing rule. The reason for this is that if the
researcher provides a large number of parties with access to the donor’s
tissue, the operation of the extinguishing rule will require the donor to
bargain with all of them to buy back his entitlement, imposing significant
market organization costs on him. If we think that there are few researchers
who will value the entitlement more than the donor, allocating the
entitlement to the donor could be preferable, as efficient allocation will be
achieved through fewer bargains.168 Thus, these are limiting factors to
consider when deploying extinguishing rules on economic efficiency
grounds.
2. Fair Allocation
Anonymity and attribution rules are not only a means of achieving the
efficient allocation of a good when its anonymity or attribution reduces its
value to the party whose identity is at issue. In addition, they are a way of
achieving fair allocation of a good when anonymity or attribution alters the
weight society is willing to accord competing interests in controlling it.
One such rationale for the rules exists when anonymization or attribution
eliminates the sole basis for the grant of the right of control at issue.
Imagine, for example, that the reason we grant a right—such as the right to
have a third party represent one’s interests in court, or the right to prevent
use of one’s tissue in research—is merely to prevent a privacy harm, and
that anonymization will prevent that harm. Under these conditions, an
extinguishing rule can be justified on the grounds that the right is no longer
deserved (regardless of whether the entitlement holder still values it more
than anyone else).169 Here, the rule would give legal recognition to the idea
allow for this. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
61, 88–89 (1986) (identifying this problem with respect to adverse possession and eminent
domain).
167. See infra Part II.C.2.
168. Cf. I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not To Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV.
1115, 1157 (2008) (suggesting a similar rationale for granting an entitlement not to be a
genetic parent).
169. This is much like the function of a variety of intellectual and real property rules that
extinguish rights in nonpossessory property. For example, under the genericism doctrine, a
trademark loses its protection if it no longer serves the consumer signaling functions for
which it was granted, see Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 147, at 46–47, and under the
changed conditions doctrine, a covenant becomes unenforceable if it is impossible to
substantially secure the benefits originally contemplated. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 9.39 (A. James Casner ed., 1952). While this justification for the changed conditions
doctrine (rather than a transaction costs justification) has been criticized for undermining the
legal autonomy of the parties who created it, see, e.g., Robinson, supra note 155, at 578, this
critique does not apply to the entitlements defeated by the extinguishing rules that I have
identified, which were not created by contract, but rather by common law and statute.

2014]

ANONYMITY

1785

that the triggering event eliminated the basis of the right, bringing about a
state of affairs in which there was no longer a reason to grant it to anyone—
an idea that would explain why these rules extinguish rights, rather than
transfer them, as some otherwise similar rules do.170
A second rationale for the rules exists when the grant of the right is based
on a societal balancing of competing distributional interests that is altered
through anonymization or identification. Take, for example, the researcher
who has invested significant time and energy into research using a
collection of tissues, but has not yet completed his research. Above, I
mentioned a transactions-cost justification for the use of an extinguishing
rule here, but we might also justify the rule on the grounds that it could
prevent a tissue source from obstructing research that would benefit society.
The idea here would be that anonymization weakens the source’s private
interests in preventing use, changing the balance of distributional concerns
and justifying the allocation of tissue to the researcher as the most socially
productive user.171
Furthermore, both of these rationales do not only apply to extinguishing
rules, but also to conditioning rules. For example, to bring a tort claim for
misappropriation of identity, the identity at issue cannot be a pure
pseudonym that protects one’s anonymity, but rather must identify the
person at issue.172 And this rule can be justified simply on grounds of
fairness if a pure pseudonym is not the type of identity in which society is
willing to allocate this legal interest and right of control.
It is important to recognize, however, that like the efficiency-oriented
rationales for extinguishing rules that I identified above, these fairnessoriented rationales focus on the benefit of the rules ex post. And as above,
this benefit might, in a limited set of circumstances, be outweighed by the
costs of the rules ex ante.
Here, the potentially troubling cases are not those in which the
beneficiary of the rule controls the triggering event (as above), but rather
those in which the original entitlement holder is able to take measures that
will prevent the triggering event or reallocation of goods that will result
from it. In these cases, there is a possibility that the extinguishing rules will
incentivize costly behavior by the original entitlement holder that is

170. This makes the rules similar to the genericism doctrine for trademark rights and the
time limit for patent and copyright (after which the rights cease to exist), while
distinguishing them from the otherwise similar rule of adverse possession for real property
(which transfer all of the entitlements of the original owner to the new owner). See Bell &
Parchomovsky, supra note 147, at 55–56 (discussing adverse possession).
171. In these regards, the rationale for the extinguishing rule would again parallel the
rationale for adverse possession, see Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40
STAN. L. REV. 611, 667–69 (1988) (stating that the doctrine grants title to the more socially
productive user of the land, and gives legal recognition to the adverse possessor’s reliance
and expectation interests that were fostered, intentionally or negligently, by the owner), and
the rationale for the changed conditions doctrine for covenants. See Stewart E. Sterk,
Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70
IOWA L. REV. 615, 643–44 (1985).
172. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
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unrelated to the logic of the entitlement. For example, if a hospital patient
who has tissue removed in the course of a medical procedure wants to
prevent his tissue from being anonymized, banked, and used in research, he
may only be able to do so through an investment of time, energy, or money
that is unrelated to the reason for which the federal Common Rule
regulations provided him with a baseline right to limit the use of his
tissue.173 In this type of situation, where the extinguishing rule does not
incentivize investments in activities that build the value that justifies the
grant of the underlying entitlement, the burdens the rule imposes are
arbitrary and thus arguably unfair in ways that those imposed by similar
rules from other areas of law are not.174 For this reason, we must look out
for this possibility when deploying extinguishing rules and modify their
applications accordingly.
* * *
In sum, my argument in this Part is that the seemingly opposite
anonymity and attribution versions of each category of rule can serve a
common set of functions across three phases of production: creation,
evaluation, and allocation. They both shape the costs and benefits of
creating goods in order to align private incentives with public goals and
values, control information flows in order to address evaluation costs
associated with using goods that have been created, and alter rights of
control over goods in order to achieve their efficient or fair allocation.
Furthermore, each of these phases of production can be targeted by various
categories of rules. Thus, when combined, my theory and taxonomy
provide a framework of previously unrecognized “design levers.”175 These
include the six types of rules that I identified in my taxonomy and the three
phases of production that I identified in my theory.
Before turning to some of the more complex design strategies revealed in
my analysis, however, it is worth briefly recapping the basic picture
developed thus far. To do so, I provide, in what follows, a broadbrushstrokes overview of how the core type of rules and functions that I
have identified would play out in the production of a single good. My focus
is the donation and banking of human biospecimens (sperm and tissue) for
use in reproductive medicine and biomedical research. This brief review
173. Cf. Cohen, supra note 168, at 1157 (discussing the self-protection costs that one
could incur in trying to prevent others from obtaining one’s genetic material and using it to
create a child).
174. For example, the rules of adverse possession for real property and genericism for
trademarks incentivize investments in activities that build the value that provides the
rationale for granting the entitlement in the first instance. Genericism incentivizes owners of
trademarks “to preserve competition in their field of trade, and to distinguish their products
from competing ones.” Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 147, at 67. Likewise, adverse
possession encourages property owners to use their property and communicate clearly with
the rest of the world about their property interest (and also deters the owner from temporarily
allowing adverse possession in order to extort quasi-rents after the adverse possessor has
improved the property). Id. at 57–58.
175. On the concept of design levers, see, for example, Benkler, supra note 28, at 312–23.
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demonstrates how each of the rules in my taxonomy can be combined with
functions identified in my theory to achieve the production of a given
good—striking different balances between creation, evaluation, and
allocation concerns.
(1) Anonymity as a right. The first basic option would be to grant donors
an anonymity right. In the creation phase, this rule would allow donors to
benefit from any existing incentives to donate, such as compensation or
personal satisfaction, while avoiding the costs of having their identified
tissue in public circulation. For example, in the research context,
anonymity would allow donors to avoid costly disclosures of private
information; and in the reproductive context, it would allow them to avoid
the imposition of legal parenthood by the state, and attributional parenthood
by their “children” and third parties.176 In these ways, the rule would
effectively allow donors to externalize the costs associated with anonymity,
which emerge ex post in the evaluation phase (that I discuss in more detail
below).177
(2) Attribution as a right. The second basic option would be to grant
donors an attribution right, which, unlike an anonymity right, would impose
few evaluation costs, but could be expected to incentivize donations from a
different donor population by allowing the internalization of certain
benefits. In the reproductive context, for example, there are sperm donors
for whom the possibility of attributional parenthood is a benefit rather than
a cost of donating.178 In the research context, there are likely donors for
whom sufficient incentive would be attribution in the form given to the
source of one of the most important cell lines in modern medicine,
Henrietta Lacks, whose immortalized cells bear an abbreviation of her name
(though in her case, attribution was not a right, nor was it offered as an
incentive).179

176. The importance of anonymity in this regard is highlighted by the fact that countries
that have prohibited anonymity have seen significant decreases in donations. Cohen, supra
note 41, at 463. On the distinction between different types of parenthood (legal, gestational,
genetic), see Cohen, supra note 168, at 1121.
177. Given that the grant of an anonymity right is not costless, the value of its production
gains need to be discounted by the lost value of the identifying information for those donors
who would have donated tissue without the right; with respect to this limited set of donors,
the creation of the right will result in a complete loss. However, as my theory also
highlights, the evaluation costs created by the anonymity right might be mitigated by the fact
that anonymity rules do not only allocate a preexisting cost-benefit profile, but also modify
it. For example, the creation of the anonymity right may result in premium payments for
identified donors, thus incentivizing more attributed donations as well.
178. Studies show that where sperm banks have introduced an open-identity option, the
percentage of open donations has grown every year that the option has been available.
Joanna E. Scheib & Rachel A. Cushing, Open-Identity Donor Insemination in the United
States: Is It on the Rise?, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 231, 232 (2007).
179. The “HeLa” cell line (named for first two letters of “Henrietta” and “Lacks”) is one
of the most important cell lines in medical history. Robin Feldman, Whose Body Is It
Anyway? Human Cells and the Strange Effects of Property and Intellectual Property Law,
63 STAN. L. REV. 1377, 1381 (2011). Henrietta Lacks was not, however, given a right of
attribution, nor did she choose to donate her cells—a subject of much controversy. See
REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS 1–7, 33, 105–09 (2011).
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(3) Anonymity as a condition. The third option would be to require that
donors be anonymous. While there may be little reason to think such a
requirement would be needed to prevent improper influence in the creation
phase—the standard rationale for this type of rule—an anonymity condition
could be desirable on similar grounds as an anonymity right. Further, while
anonymity can impose evaluation costs, my framework highlights one
potential evaluation-oriented benefit. Like the anonymity condition
imposed on certain market transactions,180 this rule would prevent third
parties from capturing value that they did not produce—for example, by
discovering and profiting from a donor’s genetic and health data.
(4) Attribution as a condition. The fourth option would be to require that
donated tissue and sperm be attributed. Doing so would reduce many
evaluation costs, including the costs of providing medical care to donorconceived children who cannot access their familial medical histories due to
sperm donor anonymity,181 and would capitalize on the research benefits of
attribution that might be undercompensated.182 Further, although the rule
would open donors to costs that might disincentivize creation, the existence
of these costs might also give rise to new donor incentives—for example,
by changing the social significance of donation in such a way that it would
appeal to a new donor base.183
(5) Anonymity, when imposed, extinguishes a right of control. The fifth
option would be to treat anonymization as a trigger that extinguishes a right
of control that donors have in their tissue or sperm. I identified the logic of
using such a rule for research tissue above, and a similar logic could apply
for sperm. For insofar as our law recognizes a person’s right not to be a
genetic parent based on the harm of “attributional parenthood,”184 an
180. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
181. While this problem could be partly solved by collecting de-identified medical
records at the time of donation, this would miss subsequent data and would not allow for
crucial follow-up questions. In addition, insofar as rich medical records can be easily reidentified, this option would provide no benefit to the donor. Of course, an attribution rule
would not itself solve the problem, as the donor might be unreachable or refuse to provide
answers. But the rule would eliminate one significant barrier to obtaining this information—
and without significant administrative costs. In addition, the rule would reduce the personal
costs to these children of not knowing the identities of their genetic parents.
182. It would also allow for the return of medically significant information to patients—a
growing practice that creates new incentives to donate, and that many scholars argue is
morally, and perhaps legally, required. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, The Uneasy Ethical and
Legal Underpinnings of Large-Scale Genomic Biobanks, 8 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM.
GENETICS 343, 359–60 (2007).
183. For example, the limited empirical data suggests that in some countries that have
imposed attribution requirements for sperm banks, donations from the traditional donor base
(of young men motivated by financial compensation) declined dramatically, but donations
subsequently rebounded with the emergence of a new donor base (of older men motivated by
a desire to help infertile couples), responding to the changing social significance of donating.
Ellen Waldman, What Do We Tell the Children?, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 517, 550–56 (2006).
Thus, the rule choice here should turn not only on whether we want a good produced, but
also on the types of producers we prefer.
184. See Cohen, supra note 168, at 1134–45 (arguing that the right not to be a genetic
parent must be grounded not in the protection of bodily integrity and best interests, but rather
in the harm of “attributional parenthood”).
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extinguishing rule eliminating this right when one’s genetic material is
anonymized could be justified on the grounds that anonymization would
eliminate the possibility of the harm that would provide the basis of the
right. Further, as in the research context, the rule may be justified as
freeing the material for more socially productive uses and serving efficiency
ends by working around the market organization costs of reallocating the
right.185
(6) Attribution, when imposed, extinguishes a right of control. The sixth
option would be to treat attribution as a trigger that extinguishes a right
associated with the use of one’s tissue or sperm. As noted in the taxonomy,
this type of rule is already used for forensic DNA biobanks, and it is
possible that a similar rationale would justify its use for sperm banks. Take,
for example, a sperm donor’s right not to be the legal parent of the children
produced with his sperm. If the only reason to grant donors this right is that
it is a necessary corollary of anonymous donation, which is desirable for its
impact on production,186 the identification of the donor—whether
consented to or not—would undermine the basis for granting the right. In
this case, a rule that extinguished a donor’s right not to be a legal parent on
the basis of his identification would be justified.187
Thus, each of the basic types of rules in my taxonomy can be combined
with considerations identified in my theory to reframe and find new
solutions to a single problem of production. In sketching how each of them
would work, I have begun to demonstrate the generative potential of my
institutional design framework, which reframes our current rule choices in a
way that reveals their contingencies, key characteristics, and alternatives.
In what follows, I explore some of the more specific and complex
implications of my analysis.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND POLICY
I have thus far developed a taxonomic account of the anonymity and
attribution rules that are at work in our legal system and a theory that
explains their core functions—a recasting of anonymity that significantly
clarifies the law that we have. In what follows, I demonstrate that my
185. These costs could be considerable if identifying information is lost or the genetic
material becomes widely distributed. However, the concerns about strategic bargaining that
I discussed with respect to research biobanks arguably have less force here. Because
potential recipients do not sink investments that require continued access to a single source’s
tissue, sources will not be able to engage in rent seeking; and because no source’s tissue is
essential to the reproductive bank, sources will have less incentive to hold out.
186. For example, the bidirectional anonymity used by sperm banks not only removes a
disincentive for many to donate, but also provides a recipient with assurance that the donor
will not later seek to bring an action to establish legal parenthood over the children produced
with his sperm.
187. Of course, the assumption in this hypothetical might not match the law we have, as
we might grant sperm donors a right not to be a legal parent for reasons other than the fact
that it is a necessary corollary of anonymous donation. For example, we might do so on the
grounds that we think they have done nothing to deserve the imposition of legal parenthood.
If so, identification would not undermine the basis of the right, such that the extinguishing
rule would not be justified.
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analysis can also help us rethink and improve our law, revealing new
solutions to difficult questions of law and policy. It does so by providing a
framework of previously unrecognized “design levers.”188 These include
the six types of rules that I identified in my taxonomy and the three phases
of production that I identified in my theory. In what follows, I draw on
these levers in developing generally applicable lessons for the design of
institutions that seek to incentivize or control the production of goods. I
then touch briefly on the corresponding production of liberal legal subjects.
A. The Production of Goods
This section identifies three implications of my analysis for institutional
design, each of which reveals more sophisticated and effective ways to
address common concerns about the production of goods that arise across
our law.
1. Controlling Production

Conditioning
rule

The first general implication of my analysis for institutional design is that
when we are concerned about “improper influence”189 in the production of
a good that performs an important public function but may also serve a
conflicting private interest, we can use a conditioning rule requiring either
anonymity or attribution to address this conflict. This implication is
counterintuitive, as the two rules are antithetical and would thus seem to
perform opposite functions. But as my analysis reveals, they can be
functionally equivalent when they target different phases of production—
specifically, when the attribution condition targets evaluation, or when the
anonymity condition targets creation. These two potential strategies can be
represented as follows:
Anonymity

Attribution

Anonymity is a condition

Attribution is a condition

(targeting creation)

(targeting evaluation)

An example will help demonstrate this point. Take, for instance, the
problem of how to prevent undue influence created by financial conflicts of
188. On the concept of design levers, see, for example, Benkler, supra note 28, at 312–23.
189. I use the term “improper influence” broadly, as the lesson I identify applies generally
to production problems that can be characterized in these terms. For example, improper
influence could be defined as “corruption,” and corruption could be defined in either
intrinsic or consequentialist terms, cf. I. Glenn Cohen, Circumvention Tourism, 97 CORNELL
L. REV. 1309, 1377 (2013) (differentiating between these forms of corruption), or it could be
defined as bias of various forms. In short, the lesson is normatively pluralist.
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interest in research universities. This problem has received renewed
attention in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, as it has become clear
that many prominent academic economists provided public policy advice in
congressional hearings and in academic publications on issues in which
they had financial interests by virtue of their connections with private
firms.190 Whether or not these connections affected these economists’
views on financial theory and regulation, they created a conflict of interest,
and the institutional design question is how to manage such conflicts—
conflicts in which an expert opinion performs an important public function
but may also provide a private benefit.
The standard way to manage such conflicts, apart from using
prohibitions, would be to require attribution of donors and funders as a
condition of engaging in relevant activities. For example, Congress could
impose disclosure requirements as a condition of testifying before
congressional committees,191 and academic journals could impose them as a
condition of publication.192 This strategy would address the conflict of
interest problem by targeting the evaluation of the resulting good: the
testimony or the publication. It would function by allowing third parties to
discount the academic’s statements and opinions according to their
understanding of the potential bias created by the conflict of interest. Thus,
it would at its core be an ex post strategy, addressing the problem after it
has arisen—which is not to say that the attribution condition would not also
function ex ante, discouraging the creation of new conflicts of interest.
However, it would only have this impact on creation ex ante by virtue of its
efficacy as an evaluation strategy ex post, which may not be as effective as
is often imagined.193
The alternative way of controlling these financial conflicts of interest—as
identified in the table above—would be to require anonymity as a condition
of funding academic research. For example, we could require that funds be
funneled through an intermediary body (either within the university or a
neutral third party) that would anonymize and distribute them to the
190. See, e.g., Emily Flitter et al., Special Report: For Some Professors, Disclosure Is
Academic, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/20/usacademics-conflicts-idUSTRE6BJ3LF20101220.
191. Currently, this is not required. For example, one study found that almost one-third
of academics who testified before congressional committees during the financial regulation
overhaul of late 2008 to early 2010 failed to disclose their private financial affiliations. Id.
192. This is already common practice in the field of biomedical research, where nearly
1,000 journals require that all authors who participate in the peer review and publication
process disclose all relationships that could be perceived as a conflict of interest. See
Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals: Conflicts of
Interest, supra note 152.
193. As discussed in greater detail below, one problem with evaluation strategies is that
the public that is being asked to perform the evaluations often does not have the expertise,
time, or desire to do so. Cf. Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse
Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2005). Further, even if
effective ex post, some attribution conditions may have perverse effects ex ante. For
example, some empirical evidence suggests that “disclosure can increase the bias in advice
because it leads advisors to feel morally licensed and strategically encouraged to exaggerate
their advice even further.” Id.
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recipients. Unlike the attribution strategy, which would intervene at the
evaluation phase in the production of the testimony or the publication, this
anonymity strategy would intervene at the creation phase. It would
function by preventing the recipient of the funds from knowing their source,
thus preventing the formation of a biased opinion. It would be an ex ante
strategy, preventing the problem from emerging rather than trying to
manage it once it has emerged.194
The upshot here is that mutually incompatible anonymity and attribution
conditions can be used to solve the same problem by intervening in
different phases in the production of the good at issue. This point is
relevant not only when designing a policy for an area that is not yet
governed by either type of rule, but also in rethinking areas in which our
law currently uses one or the other. Here, my analysis offers two general
lessons.
First, it suggests that whenever attribution requirements are being used to
address a production concern by targeting evaluation, we might instead use
an anonymity requirement to target creation.195 Take, for example, the
question of how to address the concern that politicians and expert witnesses
will be influenced by the identities of those who fund or hire them. We
currently address both of these concerns with the same conditioning rule,
requiring that the source of funds be attributed to target evaluation ex post.
Our campaign finance regulations, which require disclosure of donations,
place “the question of undue influence or preferential access in the hands of
voters, who . . . can follow the money and hold representatives accountable
for any trails they don’t like.”196 Likewise, our judicial system, in which
expert witnesses testify on behalf of the litigants who paid them, places the
question of undue influence in the hands of the jurors who can discount the
expert’s testimony according to their evaluation of the expert’s bias.197
However, as my analysis highlights, we might also address these
concerns with the opposite rule, requiring that the source of funds be
194. This type of suggestion has been made in the biomedical research context, although
not framed in these terms. For an excellent proposal along these lines, see Christopher
Tarver Robertson, The Money Blind: How To Stop Industry Bias in Biomedical Science,
Without Violating the First Amendment, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 358 (2011); see also Dennis F.
Thompson, Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 573, 575
(1993) (proposing devices such as blind trusts to insulate the physician from the secondary
interest).
195. However, the opposite is not true. When anonymity requirements are being used to
address a production concern by targeting evaluation, we cannot instead use an attribution
requirement to target creation. For example, the requirement that PG&E use an agent to
remain anonymous when buying futures (which prevents parties from using its identity when
evaluating the purchases) is not interchangeable with a requirement that its purchases be
attributed. Thus, attention to the intersection between the rules and the three phases of
production not only reveals when they are interchangeable, but also when they are not.
196. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311,
326; see also 11 C.F.R. § 110.4 (2013). This strategy has been in use since the Publicity Act
of 1910. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822; Deborah G. Johnson et al., Campaign
Disclosure, Privacy and Transparency, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 959, 965–68 (2011).
197. See 3 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL
§ 702.03[12] (10th ed. 2011).
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anonymous in order to target the creation of undue influence. For example,
to address this problem in the context of campaign donations, we might
require that donations—like votes—be collected in a way that imposes
anonymity on them and prevents a donor from proving to a politician that
he or she made a given donation.198 Likewise, to address the problem of
biased expert testimony in civil litigation, we could create an intermediary
agency that litigants could use to hire experts to render opinions without
knowledge of the litigants’ identity.199
Second, and conversely, my analysis suggests that whenever anonymity
requirements are being used to address a production concern by targeting
creation, we might instead use an attribution requirement to target
evaluation.200 For example, undue influence in the production of votes in
elections—like undue influence in the production of campaign donations
and expert scientific testimony—has many margins on which anonymity
and attribution rules could operate. Currently, we require anonymity to
address this concern, as our policy is made with a focus on the relationship
between the voter and the person trying to corrupt the vote, seeking to
prevent undue influence at the upstream phase of creation.
However, if we were to instead focus on the relationship between the
voter and the public, we would see that we could achieve the same goal by
requiring that votes be attributed. In imposing an attribution condition, we
would essentially import the logic of our current campaign donation law
into our election law—rather than vice versa, as discussed above. Just as
the attribution of campaign donations allows voters to hold representatives
accountable for any money trails that they do not like, attribution of votes
would, as John Stuart Mill argued, force voters to “adhere to conduct of
which at least some decent account can be given.”201 In this way, we would
replace an anonymity requirement that addresses corruption by targeting the
creation of votes with an attribution requirement that would target their
evaluation.
Thus, the more general lesson revealed by my framework is that the
choice between anonymity and attribution rules should not only be based on
the nature of the good at issue and a first-order preference for secrecy or
disclosure, but also on a second-order preference for the rule that targets the
198. A variety of scholars and policymakers have made suggestions along these lines,
though none have been framed in these terms, nor have they been seen as part of a generally
available institutional design move. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 6, at 268 n.26
(citing various proposals). For a detailed account of how this system might work in practice
to prevent donors from revealing their donations, see id. at 93–110, and Ayres & Bulow,
supra note 80.
199. For a proposal of a sophisticated double-blind system and explanation of why selfinterested litigants might chose to use it, see Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174 (2010).
200. However, the opposite is not true. See supra note 195. When attribution
requirements are being used to target creation, we cannot instead use an anonymity
requirement to target evaluation. For example, when attribution requirements are used to
prevent a speaker from defaming another, an anonymity requirement will do nothing to
facilitate evaluation of the problem.
201. MILL, supra note 1, at 200.
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margin of the production problem that is easier to solve—and furthermore,
that this latter preference should be based on a consideration and balancing
of two core factors.202
First, we must consider the likely difficulty of imposing perfect, rather
than partial, anonymity or attribution. For as Jeremy Bentham long ago
realized with respect to voting: “In secret voting, the secresy cannot be too
profound: in public voting, the publicity can never be too great. The most
detrimental arrangement would be that of demi-publicity.”203 Thus, in
choosing a rule, we must determine the feasibility of creating an institution
that imposes an anonymity condition in a way that cannot easily be pierced
by private parties trying to resist it, and compare this to the feasibility of
creating an institution that imposes an attribution condition in a way that the
information can be effectively accessed by the public.
Second, we must consider the likely efficacy of anonymity and
attribution strategies—if perfectly imposed and maintained—in preventing
improper influence in the production of a given good. With respect to
anonymity, this assessment will likely be fairly simple, as a creationoriented anonymity strategy does not require any further action beyond
implementation and maintenance to be effective. An evaluation-oriented
attribution strategy, by contrast, requires several additional steps to be
effective, each of which must be considered when choosing a rule. First,
we must consider whether the identifying information will actually allow
the evaluator to accurately identify and differentiate improper influence
from normal activity, which may be more difficult than is often imagined,
turning on both the nature of the activity204 as well as the expertise of the
evaluator.205 Second, we must consider whether the evaluator will be able
to effectively respond to any detected improper influence, which may also
be more difficult than is often imagined, turning on whether sanctions are

202. When neither of the strategies has a clear benefit over the other, we might even use a
middle path strategy suggested by my framework, which is to provide the parties being
regulated with the option to choose between anonymity and attribution conditions. One of
the few laws that does this is the Federal Ethics in Government Act, which requires that
certain federal officeholders either fully disclose all their financial holdings and any possible
conflicts of interest, or place their holdings in a blind trust. 5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 102(a) (2012).
203. Jeremy Bentham, Essay on Political Tactics, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
259, 370 (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, William Tait 1843); see also Allison R. Hayward,
Bentham & Ballots: Tradeoffs Between Secrecy and Accountability in How We Vote, 26 J.L.
& POL. 39, 78 (2010) (arguing against write-in ballots and other forms of voting that are
neither completely secret nor completely public).
204. For example, if a politician changes a policy position to agree with a donor
immediately after receiving a large donation from that donor, improper influence might be
the best explanation for the change, making attribution an effective strategy. But if the
change does not take place immediately, it may be more difficult to differentiate the
improper from the normal policy change, thus making attribution a less effective strategy.
205. While some such evaluations may be within the competency of the general public,
others may benefit from experience of expertise. For example, if the question is whether an
expert witness opinion is biased, judges or other repeat players might be more effective than
jurors in making use of the attribution condition.
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actually available206 and whether the value of the good at issue can be
accurately discounted.207
In short, anonymity and attribution strategies will often have strengths
and weaknesses that are inversely related: attribution will often be easier to
implement and maintain, because unlike anonymity, it cannot be easily
pierced by parties trying to resist it. Anonymity, however, if achieved, will
often be more effective, because it avoids the difficulties of using and
acting on the basis of the information that an attribution strategy provides.
Thus, the choice between rules should turn primarily on a balancing of
these two general factors, in combination with context-specific
considerations, such as whether one rule will cause a decline in the
production of the good, and if so whether this is tolerable.208
2. Tailoring Production
A second core implication of my analysis for institutional design is that
when we want to create narrowly tailored solutions to production concerns,
an unrecognized but powerful strategy is to combine anonymity and
attribution rules that are in tension with each other and that target different
phases of production, using one as a baseline rule to address our primary
production concerns, and another to limit that baseline rule and address
secondary concerns.
A very simple example of this type of strategy can be seen in existing
criminal law, where the law allows people to provide tips to the police
anonymously (a baseline entitlement rule to address creation concerns), but
courts will not allow an anonymous tip to provide probable cause in and of
itself (a conditioning rule to address evaluation concerns).209
In what follows, I focus on a more sophisticated application of this
lesson. I show how we might adopt a baseline rule under which
anonymization extinguishes one’s right of control over a good (on the
grounds that this will on average result in the efficient allocation of the
good), but grant a right of attribution that will allow someone who objects
to this anonymization to prevent it (in order to individually address
secondary concerns about the creation, evaluation, or fair allocation of the
good). This design strategy can be represented as follows:

206. For example, if a voter wants to sanction a politician who changed positions in
response to a donation, there must be another candidate on the ballot who the voter prefers.
207. Take, for example, the requirement that industry funding of scientific research be
attributed in most academic publications. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. If the
rationale for this rule is that it will allow those using the study to discount its findings
according to their evaluation of the authors’ potential bias, the efficacy of the rule will turn
on the accuracy of such discounting, which some empirical evidence draws into question.
208. For example, requiring anonymity for campaign donations and research funding
might cause a decline in the production of both of these goods, but we might be less
concerned about this in the former case if we think that the public does not benefit from
current levels of campaign spending.
209. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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Attribution

Attribution of a good is a right
(as a limiting rule targeting our
secondary creation concerns)
Anonymization
extinguishes a right of
control over a good
(as a baseline rule targeting
our primary allocational
concerns)

Under this combination of anonymity and attribution rules, the entitlement
rule would limit and tailor the operation of the extinguishing rule.
Further, this is just one way of combining rules that are in tension with
each other to address competing production concerns. Other options
include: an anonymity condition combined with an attribution right; an
attribution requirement combined with an anonymity right; and an
attribution extinguishing rule combined with an anonymity right. To
demonstrate the practical value of this design strategy, however, I will focus
on the combination of rules represented in the table. And I will reveal its
payoff in the current legal controversy over the control of human tissue
samples in research biobanks—a controversy whose resolution will
significantly impact the future of healthcare and the materialization of the
promises of personalized medicine.210
a. The Controversy
Biobanks are large-scale collections of human biospecimens (e.g., blood,
saliva, and surgical tissue) and associated data (e.g., personal health
information about the sources) that play a crucial role in medical genomics
research.211 They often contain thousands of samples and are organized
and searchable entities that make lending decisions to qualified researchers.
Currently, samples from the vast majority of Americans are being stored
210. The research enabled by large scale biobanking will, for example, dramatically
accelerate the discovery of the genetics of many diseases, lower the costs of drug discovery
and medical device development, and provide the basis for a new paradigm of personalized
medicine in which choice of drug and drug dose will be based on an individual’s genetics,
rather than the genetics of the population. See, e.g., Ultan McDermott et al., Genomic
Medicine: Genomics and the Continuum of Cancer Care, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 340, 347
(2011).
211. See 1 NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 1–2 (1999), available at
https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/handle/1805/22.
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and studied in biobanks.212 While some of these individuals knowingly
contributed their samples for research purposes, most were unaware at the
time of extraction that their tissue or fluids would be banked and used for
research purposes.213 Although consent of the source is normally required
for research on human biospecimens, anonymization of tissue extinguishes
this requirement, thereby freeing the tissue for unconsented use. This
extinguishing rule achieves the production of a valuable social good. And
while the justification for this rule has never been well theorized, it seems
to be justified—at least as a general baseline rule—by the efficient
allocation functions that it can perform (which I explored in depth in Part
II.C).214
However, it is possible that the rule is overbroad in this respect, and it is
currently the subject of growing criticism by academics, regulators, and
biomedical researchers. Their criticisms are based on three general
concerns, each involving what my theory reveals to be a different phase of
production. With respect to “creation,” the concern is that the rule is
contributing to a growing lack of public trust in biomedical research that
will result in a decline in voluntary tissue donations.215 With respect to
“evaluation,” the concern is that the rule provides incentives to anonymize,
which eliminates information that would be valuable in evaluating research
results.216 And with respect to “allocation,” the concern is that the rule fails
to take into account valid ethical interests that tissue sources have in the use
of their tissue that exist regardless of anonymization.217
Attempts to address these concerns—and provide tissue sources with
some rights of control over their tissue—have given rise to a few serious
reform proposals. The first is to grant all tissue sources some form of
personal or intellectual property right in their tissue that would allow for the
imposition of general use restrictions on tissue, regardless of whether the
tissue is anonymized.218 The second, advanced by the U.S. Department of
212. In 1999, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) estimated that
biobanks across the United States housed at least 282 million specimens—from over 176
million individuals—and that over 20 million new samples were being added each year. See
id.
213. Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163, 189–90
(2000).
214. See supra Part II.C.
215. E.g., Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg.
44,512, 44,523 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56, and 45 C.F.R. pts. 46,
160, 164).
216. E.g., Greely, supra note 182.
217. E.g., Natalie Ram, Assigning Rights and Protecting Interests: Constructing Ethical
and Efficient Legal Rights in Human Tissue Research, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 119, 131–32
(2009).
218. On general property rights, see Feldman, supra note 179, at 1381–85; Donna M.
Gitter, Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition of Human
Research Participants’ Property Rights in Their Biological Material, 61 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 257 (2004). On intellectual property rights, see Ram, supra note 217, at 143, 152. See
also Mark A. Hall, Property, Privacy, and the Pursuit of Interconnected Electronic Medical
Records, 95 IOWA L. REV. 631, 651 (2010).
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Health and Human Services in an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking,
is to eliminate the current extinguishing rule and require that all research be
consented to regardless of anonymization.219 The third is to provide this
right only to those who opt in to this protection, such that anonymization
would generally eliminate the consent requirement, but a tissue source
could exercise a right to prevent research regardless of anonymization.
As I argue below, however, all three of these proposals are undesirably
overbroad with respect to their core aims. Furthermore, those aims can be
achieved and problems can be avoided by adopting the combination of
anonymity and attribution rules identified above. Specifically, I propose
combining our current extinguishing rule with an entitlement rule granting a
right of attribution in one’s tissue—a right modeled on the right of
attribution of artists under VARA, which likewise attempts to address
ethical, identity-based production concerns.220 This strategy would allow
those who care about the use of their tissue to prevent researchers from
anonymizing it and using it outside the scope of their consent, but would
otherwise leave intact the various production benefits of a regime that
allows anonymization to extinguish private rights of control.
In making this argument, I do not take a normative position in the debate
over whether tissue sources should be given rights of control over their
tissue. My argument, here and throughout this article, is about the
instrumental value of my framework in achieving a given normative goal.
In this case, it provides a completely novel and narrowly tailored way of
modifying the current extinguishing rule—one that shares the strengths of
the dominant reform proposals while avoiding many of their weaknesses.
b. Possible Solutions
In order to contextualize a key feature of the existing proposals and my
alternative, it is worth briefly explaining as a preliminary matter why I have
not included private ordering through contract as an option for serious
consideration. The reason is that contract law alone will not allow a tissue
source to create enforceable use restrictions against researchers who are not
party to the contract, and it is highly likely, given the nature of public sector
biomedical research, that samples will be transferred to third-party
researchers. While the source could create a contract with the original
recipient prohibiting such transfers, contractually created limits on the
alienation of property are (absent an underlying real or intellectual property

219. See Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. at
44,523; see also Eriksson & Helgesson, supra note 100, at 1073. This position also has
significant public support. See, e.g., Evette J. Ludman et al., Glad You Asked: Participants’
Opinions of Re-consent for dbGaP Data Submission, 5 J. EMP. RES. ON HUM. RES. ETHICS 9
(2010).
220. See, e.g., Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining
that the right comes from the canon of “moral rights” that recognizes interests of a “noneconomic and personal nature”).
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right) generally unenforceable.221 Further, even if such a clause were
enforceable, it would only allow the source to bring a breach of contract
claim against the original recipient.
Thus, for someone who wants to impose hard limits on the use of his or
her tissue, rights based solely in contract will be ineffective.222 What this
person will need is some form of right that runs with the tissue, such as a
right of attribution, a right of control granted by a generally applicable
regulation, or a restrictive servitude based on an intellectual or personal
property right.
The very feature that makes a restrictive servitude based on a property
right desirable when compared to contract, however, makes it problematic
in other respects. The first is a problem of overbreadth, as the creation of
either type of property right could burden research by requiring pedigree
checks on every tissue sample, deter commercial applications by creating
uncertainty over legal title, and produce a “tragedy of the anticommons” by
allowing millions of tissue sources to negotiate a benefit share.223 The
second problem is that our law does not allow for the creation of servitudes
in personal property,224 and there are strong efficiency and fairness
rationales for this limitation, deriving from considerations of information
costs225 and dead hand control.226 The third is that, although our law does
allow for use restrictions on intellectual property, granting persons
221. See generally RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 404 (1944).
222. For a discussion of the ways in which law and economics literature ignores this
distinctive character of property rights and a critique of this trend, see Thomas W. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357,
385 (2001). On the functional distinction between in rem and in personam rights, see
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 773 (2001).
223. See Jasper Bovenberg, Whose Tissue Is It Anyway?, 23 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY
929, 931 (2005). On the idea of the anticommons, see Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the
Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621,
624 (1998).
224. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 18–19 (2000) (“[A]lthough the
case law is rather thin, it . . . appears that one cannot create servitudes in personal
property.”).
225. While mechanisms to ameliorate some of these costs have been developed for real
property, they are often inapplicable to personal property. Molly Shaffer Van Houweling,
The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 914–916 (2008). Further, even if the mechanisms
were applicable, the relatively lower value of personal property would often make their use
ineffectual or inefficient. Id. at 914–16, 932–33; see also Merrill & Smith, supra note 224, at
26–34 (discussing “measurement-cost externalities”). But see Glen O. Robinson, Personal
Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1482–87 (2004) (arguing that information
costs do not support prohibition on personal property servitudes).
226. For example, dead hand control undermines the autonomy of present owners, creates
obstacles to alienation, and imposes potentially inefficient land-use choices. Van Houweling,
supra note 225, at 901–03. It is arguable that concerns about the waste of a socially valuable
asset have less force when the asset is not as valuable as land, and when the value of the
asset will likely decrease dramatically over time, as is the case with many forms of personal
property. Id. at 921. However, biological tissues are not like disposable consumer goods in
that they can be just as valuable for research in the future as they are today, and perhaps even
more so.
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intellectual property rights in genetic information is normatively and legally
problematic for reasons that have been well established in related
contexts,227 as well as practical reasons that have received less attention.228
Thus, these general property-based solutions pose problems of overbreadth that are avoided by the other solutions (i.e., the modified consent
requirements and the right of attribution), each of which is based in
generally applicable law that is more narrowly tailored to the problem at
hand.
However, the two proposed modifications of the consent requirement are
overbroad in other ways. Take, for example, the proposal by the
Department of Health and Human Services to replace the current
extinguishing rule with a rule requiring that all research be consented to,
regardless of anonymization.229 This rule would likely impose inefficient
burdens on research, as it would create significant transaction costs (in
obtaining sources’ consent) and prevent research (when sources cannot be
located) without any benefit in many cases—specifically, all the cases in
which the sources would not have objected to the anonymized research.
The other regulatory modification would solve this problem by providing a
tissue source with the right to opt in to the protection, requiring consent for
anonymized research only in those cases in which the tissue source required
it. But closer examination reveals that even this option provides tissue
sources with a right that is arguably too expansive. The reason is that
providing tissue sources with a general right to withhold their consent
would create an economic incentive to do so—as part of a strategic
bargaining strategy—even when they do not object to research on their
tissue. Thus, the scope of interventions allowed by the right would not be
tailored to the personal, identity-based ethical interests that the reforms seek
to recognize by granting tissue sources the right to prevent research on their
anonymized samples.
By contrast, granting a VARA-styled right of attribution in tissue would
allow sources to in effect “opt out” of the extinguishing rule (by preventing
the anonymization of their tissue), but would not create economic
incentives to exercise the right as a bargaining chip. The reason for this
derives from the fact that property rights can be limited by second-order
rules that make persons’ incentives for exercising a right depend on their
reasons for doing so,230 and VARA contains such a rule. The right of
227. For example, there is an extensive literature on the problems of granting property
rights in personal information. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Private Property, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1545 (2000); Pamela Samuelson, Privacy As Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1125, 1136–46 (2000). On the problems with respect to genetic information specifically, see
Suter, supra note 101.
228. For example, almost all of one’s genetic information is shared by others. Even
highly unusual mutations might be shared with siblings or parents. Thus, as a practical
matter, it would often be impossible to determine which genetic data is owned by which
persons—or groups of persons.
229. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
230. I draw this idea from Lee Fennell, who suggests that inalienability rules allow us to
“make the entitlement to engage in a behavior depend on one’s reason for wishing to engage
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attribution is limited by what can be considered a “sticky default” or
“impeding altering rule,”231 under which the right can only be waived
though a signed written instrument “specifically identify[ing] the work, and
uses of that work, to which the waiver applies.”232 Applied in the biobank
context, such a restriction would often eliminate the economic value of
obtaining a waiver, as most research uses of tissue are of little or unknown
economic value. For all of these cases, the grant of a right of attribution
would satisfy the concerns of those who argue that the law should recognize
an individual’s ethical interests in preventing the use of his or her tissue,
while at the same time mitigating the possibility that granting such control
would lead to strategic holdouts, rent seeking, and an inefficient allocation
of tissue for research. Of course, there would be exceptions to this, such as
when a specific study on a specific sample is expected to have high value.
But for the vast majority of research, the waiver restriction on the right of
attribution would provide narrow tailoring that would help satisfy these
important conflicting production concerns.233
A further benefit of this strategy is that it would work within the
normative framework of existing human subjects regulations. Unlike the
other options identified, it would not require grounding in a theory that
would allow for disassociated rights of control, but rather would adopt the
widely accepted idea in our law that persons have a normatively compelling

in it.” Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1454 (2009). It
seems to me that her statement, while insightful, is not quite right. An inalienability or
sticky default rule does not alter the entitlement to engage in a behavior on the basis of one’s
reasons; rather, it takes certain incentives off the table.
231. I take these concepts from Ian Ayres, who argues that externalities and paternalistic
concerns can justify mandatory restrictions on freedom of contract, but that when these
concerns are not sufficient to support mandatory rules, lawmakers can instead create sticky
defaults through impeding altering rules that artificially increase the difficulty of opt out. Ian
Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032
(2012).
232. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (2012). The severe restrictions on waiver were a
compromise between the Senate, which “was adamant in opposing waiver, believing that if
waiver were permitted, artists routinely would be forced to grant waivers, thereby
eviscerating the law,” and the House, which recognized such a possibility, but “believed that
to prohibit all waivers would ‘inhibit normal commercial practices.’” 5 WILLIAM F. PATRY,
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 16:37 (2012) (quoting H.R. REP NO. 101-514, at 18 (1990)).
233. Further, as is often the case with identity-based rights, the right of attribution under
VARA is nontransferable, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d), (e)(1), which in the biobanking context
would serve two functions. First, an inalienability rule would prevent others from gaining
the benefit of the right. Whereas a general property right in tissue that allowed for the
imposition of servitudes could be used for any purpose, the scope of interventions allowed
by the right of attribution would be partially tailored to the personal interests that advocates
of property rights in tissue want to protect. Second, the restriction would comply with the
“nearly unanimous opinion in the medical research and public policy communities that tissue
donors should be subject to a no-compensation rule.” Russell Korobkin, Buying and Selling
Human Tissues for Stem Cell Research, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 45, 47 (2007) (critiquing this
view). While this policy is often justified by reference to concerns about commoditization,
see, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1855 (1987),
it is possible that these moral concerns can be reframed as market externalities. See, e.g.,
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 154, at 1111–12; Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain
Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 990 (1985).
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interest in limiting the use of their tissue if it is directly identified with
them. The right would merely provide those who feel that research on their
tissue constitutes a form of research on their person with a way to give legal
effect to this form of biological identity, conditioning their control on their
willingness to require that their tissue be identified with them.234
In short, if we are going to modify our law to give legal recognition to
tissue sources’ ethical interests in preventing the anonymization and use of
their tissue, the institutional-design move revealed by my framework—
using an entitlement rule to limit an extinguishing rule—would be a
completely novel, narrowly tailored, and pragmatically desirable way of
doing so. Furthermore, and more importantly, this general strategy of
combining anonymity and attribution rules that are in tension with each
other (of which I have explored just one of many possible variants)235 can
be applied across our law to develop more refined solutions to production
concerns—for goods ranging from campaign contributions236 to
information about criminal activity.237

234. In addition, because the right of attribution would work within this normative
framework that is shared by a variety of other federal and state statutes that allow
anonymization to extinguish rights—including the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(2012), the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1936, and various state statutes that declare genetic information to be the
exclusive property of its source—it could be a single intervention that applied broadly if
desired. Moreover, it could be granted by the federal government to impact rights under
state law, or by a state to impact rights under federal law if not preempted.
235. Other combinations along these lines could include: an anonymity condition
combined with an attribution right; an attribution requirement combined with an anonymity
right; and an attribution extinguishing rule combined with an anonymity right.
236. In fact, several proposed solutions to the problem of political corruption associated
with campaign contributions can be read as employing this strategy, though they have not
been framed in these terms. For example, Ayres and Ackerman have proposed altering the
current disclosure regime by funneling donations through the FEC and providing donors
with a right to an anonymous refund, so that candidates will be unable to determine how
much money a donor has given. Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, The Secret Refund Booth, 73
U. CHI. L. REV. 1107, 1110–11 (2006). Or alternatively, we might do the reverse, requiring
that donations be anonymous as a baseline, but then grant donors a right to partial
attribution. Cf. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 6, at 93–110 (proposing a variant of this).
Categorized in the terms of my framework, each of these proposals would use a combination
of two rules—an attribution condition with an anonymity right in the first, and an anonymity
condition with an attribution right in the second—to strike a balance between the evaluationoriented benefits of attributed donations and the creation-oriented benefits of anonymous
donations. In this way, each would create a more refined solution than is possible through a
single rule alone.
237. In fact, our law arguably already uses one such combination. We allow people to
provide police tips anonymously (an entitlement rule targeting the creation of information by
altering incentives), but courts have generally held that an anonymously provided tip cannot
by itself provide probable cause (a conditioning rule targeting evaluation concerns about the
resulting information). See supra note 90 and accompanying text. In this way, anonymity
and attribution rules that target different phases of production are used in combination to
provide a better solution than a single rule alone.
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3. Balancing Production
A third institutional-design implication of my analysis is that when we
want to incentivize the creation of a good for which the source will suffer
costs if identified, but a loss of information about the source’s identity will
impose evaluation costs on the public, we can balance these goals by either
granting a limited anonymity right or imposing a pseudonymity condition.
These two potential strategies can be represented as follows:

Entitlement
rule

Anonymity is a right (targeting
creation) limited by good cause
(targeting evaluation)

Conditioning
rule

Anonymity

Pseudonymity is a condition
(targeting both creation and
evaluation)

Attribution

To demonstrate the value of these two very different strategies, I will in
this section focus on their application to a current legal controversy
concerning the anonymity and attribution of sperm donors, where
policymakers are currently struggling to balance creation- and evaluationoriented societal goals. On the creation side, the rationale for granting an
anonymity right is to allow donors to benefit from any existing incentives to
donate, such as compensation or personal satisfaction, while avoiding key
costs of doing so. As noted above,238 anonymity allows them to avoid the
imposition of parenthood by the state, which can impose legal parenthood,
as well as by their “children” and third parties, who can impose
“attributional parenthood,” and the various costs associated with both forms
of parenthood.239 In this way, it operates ex ante to facilitate the public
availability of a biomedical good for infertile couples.
However, anonymity imposes significant costs ex post with respect to
evaluation. For example, there are the public costs of providing medical
care to children who cannot access their familial medical histories, as well
as the costs to children who desire to know their genetic parents. Focusing
on these costs, many countries in Europe and the British Commonwealth
have recently adopted laws that establish mandatory registries for donors
238. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
239. On the distinction between different types of parenthood (legal, gestational, and
genetic), see Cohen, supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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and provide donor-conceived children with the right to request and receive
their donor’s name and last-known address once they reach a given age.240
And there is a growing movement to do the same in the United States.241
Yet, paying attention to the impact of mandatory registry laws on
production ex ante reveals a problem in their normative justification. For as
Glenn Cohen has demonstrated, the ex ante effects make the standard
rationale for such laws—to protect the interests of the children produced
with donor sperm—run afoul of what is known as the “nonidentity
problem.”242 As applied here, the problem arises from the fact that the laws
can be expected to cause donors who would have donated anonymously to
no longer donate,243 thus preventing the conception of the particular
children that the laws seek to protect (the children of anonymous
donors).244 In this way, the laws will effectively “‘protect’ these particular
children out of existence,”245 and as a result, the laws cannot be generally
justified by a concern for the interests of these children.246 However, as my
framework reveals, there are two ways of limiting donors’ anonymity rights
that address the core public evaluation costs without running afoul of the
core problems on the creation side.
The first way of striking a balance between the creation benefits of
anonymity and the evaluation benefits of attribution is to use pseudonymity
rather than pure anonymity, for as I discussed above, pseudonymity is a
type of anonymity that can perform some of the same functions as
attribution.247 For example, we could impose a pseudonymity condition on
donors, requiring that all of an individual’s donations be associated with a
pseudonym—potentially just a number—in a national registry that would be
untraceable to his actual identity. Because this would not impose any new
costs on donors, as most sperm banks already use numerical identifiers, it
240. I. Glenn Cohen, Rethinking Sperm-Donor Anonymity: Of Changed Selves, Nonidentity, and One-Night Stands, 100 GEO. L.J. 431, 432 (2012).
241. See, e.g., Making Laws About Making Babies, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/13/making-laws-about-making-babies.
242. See Cohen, supra note 41; Cohen, supra note 240 .
243. The limited empirical evidence suggests that countries that have imposed anonymity
prohibitions have experienced significant decreases in donations. Cohen, supra note 41, at
463. In some of these countries, this decline has been followed by a rebound, but the
evidence suggests that the new donations have come from a different donor demographic.
Waldman, supra note 183, at 550–56. Thus, although not conclusive as to causation, the
evidence supports the inference that anonymity restrictions cause donors who would have
donated anonymously to no longer donate.
244. The reduction in donations will not only prevent some persons from procreating at
all, but will also impact with whom and when many other people procreate, both of which
also cause a nonidentity problem. Cohen, supra note 41, at 462–65. Of course, this will not
always be the case. There might be some donor-recipient matches that would be identical
under either regime. For the limited group of children produced by these matches, the
nonidentity critique of the laws does not apply. Id. at 465. Cohen argues, however, that this
limited group cannot justify the burdens imposed by the laws. Id. at 474–81.
245. Cohen, supra note 240, at 436.
246. The only way the children of anonymous donors would benefit from being regulated
out of existence is if their lives would have not been worth living, which is not a claim that
advocates of the laws make.
247. See supra Part I.B.
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would not run afoul of creation-oriented concerns, including the nonidentity
problem. But by allowing for the centralized accumulation of anonymous
information about the source—including information about his health
history, the identities of the children that were produced with his sperm, and
their health outcomes—it would perform many of the same functions as an
attribution requirement. For example, it would satisfy the desires of many
donor-conceived children to find their half-siblings, and provide
information that might be invaluable in their healthcare.248 However,
imposing a pseudonymity condition would not perform all of the purposes
of requiring attribution; most centrally, it would not allow children to find
their genetic parents, which is a goal of many.
Another way of striking a balance between the creation benefits of
anonymity and the evaluation benefits of attribution is to provide donorconceived children with the right to de-anonymize their donors for good
cause. Compared to the pseudonymity option, this option has evaluation
costs and benefits. For example, it provides more information about the
donor when the good cause standard is met (e.g., it would allow for followup inquiries into the donor’s familial health history that might be relevant to
providing medical care to the donor-conceived child), but provides no
information in cases where the standard is not met. On the creation side,
this option would expose donors to the risk of de-anonymization and thus
would likely disincentivize some donations. However, it would avoid the
nonidentity problem if the right were not granted prospectively to resulting
children (as is often proposed), but rather only retroactively to existing
children who demonstrate to a judge an interest in knowing their parents’
identities. For under this rule, the children whose interests would justify the
grant of the right would be identical to the children whose interests would
be served by it.249
Furthermore, sperm donation is just one area in which this strategy of
combining rules can help solve difficult questions of policy. Across our
law—in areas ranging from the protection of free speech to the public
circulation of health records—we can find situations in which imposing an
attribution condition will be normatively and instrumentally undesirable
because of its impact on the creation of goods ex ante, but anonymity will
impose significant evaluation costs on the public ex post. In these
situations, we might be able to strike a balance between these concerns by

248. In addition, in the rare case, it would prevent unintended incest between halfsiblings. See Naomi Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing the Line—or the Curtain?—for
Reproductive Technology, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 59 (2009).
249. Of course, the retroactive grant of the right to existing children might alter which
future children come into existence. For example, a potential sperm donor might not donate
out of concern that in the future a child conceived with his sperm will be granted a right to
discover his identity. But this does not pose a nonidentity problem, for any child who is in
existence can—regardless of the causal chain that produced him—have a real interest in
knowing his biological parents’ identities. Any contrary claim would entail a metaphysical
conception of interests that is incompatible with our law’s conception. I recognize, however,
that this retroactive option might be rejected by some on grounds of fairness, which is why
advocates of the registry laws generally advocate for prospective application.
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either imposing a pseudonymity condition that is generally applicable, or
granting an anonymity right limited by an individual showing of good
cause.
B. The Production of Liberal Legal Subjects
Having demonstrated three key practical implications of my analysis for
institutional design, I will now turn briefly to a broader point about the
application of my framework. While I have thus far argued that multiple
mutually exclusive types and combinations of anonymity rules can be used
to address the same problem of production, the rules are of course not
equivalent in every way. A key difference derives from the fact that the
subject matter of the rules is not always left unaltered by their use.
Different configurations of rules may instantiate different conceptions of
the goods being produced—and of the subjects producing them. As with
privacy rules, the choice and design of anonymity rules shapes the self and
society.250 While this aspect of production is one that will require separate
treatment in another article, I will briefly sketch two examples of its
connection to my framework here, thereby returning to the relationship
between anonymity and the liberal legal subject with which I began.
In the elections example that I discussed above, for example, I
suggested—following Mill—that we might use an attribution condition,
instead of an anonymity condition, to prevent corruption in voting.
However, the use of an attribution requirement might bring with it a shift in
how the nature of voting is commonly understood. For example, Mill
conceptualized voting in very different terms than many people do today.
As noted in the introduction to this Article, he thought that the vote is not
given to the subject of a democracy “for himself; for his particular use and
benefit,” but rather “as a trust for the public.”251 Thus, although two
opposite conditioning rules might both prevent the same forms of
corruption, they might produce very different types of democratic subjects.
Anonymity and attribution conditions for voting can in fact be seen as
representative of the two ends of the spectrum of modern views regarding
the nature and function of democracy. There is a resemblance between
Mill’s attribution position and theories of deliberative democracy, which
emphasize the giving of public reasons. These theories, rooted historically
in republicanism, “contend that an expression of the public will can
legitimately bind those who are subject to it only insofar as it is reasoned,
well-informed, and formulated after mutual consultation and discussion.”252
By contrast, economic theories rooted in liberalism see voting as “a
procedure for maximizing social utility by recording and aggregating as

250. Peter Galison & Martha Minow, Our Privacy, Ourselves in the Age of Technological
Intrusions, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE “WAR ON TERROR” 258, 277–284 (Richard Ashby
Wilson ed., 2005) (discussing the relationship between constructions of privacy, the self, and
society).
251. MILL, supra note 1, at 190.
252. Gardner, supra note 11, at 935.
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accurately as possible the private self-interest of each citizen.”253 On this
view, it is the impersonal operation of democracy’s aggregating
mechanisms that achieves the common good, not self-conscious attempts by
individuals to determine how to advance it. Imposing anonymity as a
condition can be seen as expressive of this latter privately oriented
approach.
This is not to say, however, that imposing an anonymity requirement on
voting treats the vote as a completely private good. There are other
anonymity rules that would push the vote further into the domain of private
choice. For example, creating a right of anonymity (as is the case in some
jurisdictions) moves away from the publicly oriented rationale articulated
by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts when it held that because ballot
secrecy “safeguards society’s interest in the integrity of elections, . . . the
right to a secret ballot is not an individual right which may be waived by a
good faith voter.”254 If anonymity were a right, rather than a requirement,
the voter would be able to choose anonymity to avoid accountability, or
choose attribution to sell his vote.
For these reasons, the act of choosing between an anonymity right and an
anonymity requirement, or between an anonymity requirement and an
attribution requirement, should be seen as a choice between competing
conceptions of what type of good a vote is meant to be, and what voting is
for.255 And the same is true of the production of biomedical goods.
With research biobanking, for example, the choice of anonymity rule will
determine whether a biobanked tissue sample is a good in which the human
subject has a legally cognizable interest, or is instead one in which the only
cognizable interests are those of the public. Under the current federal
Common Rule regulations, anonymization of the tissue transforms it from a
limited-use resource under the ultimate control of a private party, into an
unlimited-use resource that is available to public sector research.256 Under
the right of attribution strategy explored above, by contrast, the human
subject would be able to prevent this shift and maintain a private property
interest in his tissue, transforming his genetic endowment into private
biocapital to be utilized like other forms of capital.257

253. Id. at 934.
254. McCavitt v. Registrars of Voters, 434 N.E.2d 620, 631 (Mass. 1982) (emphasis
added).
255. Likewise, if we were to impose an anonymity condition on the hiring of experts to
testify in court, we would—at least in part—be transforming expert testimony from a private
good deployed in the service of one litigant’s personal goal of winning, to “a self-financing
public good for litigants to use in serving their private and the public interests.” Robertson,
supra note 199, at 242. And if we were to impose an anonymity condition on political
donations, we would be transforming them from a good potentially deployed in the service
of private quid pro quo, into a good in service of public campaign finance.
256. See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.
257. On biocapital and biobanks, see Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in
Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917, 986–992. See also generally KAUSHIK SUNDER RAJAN,
BIOCAPITAL: THE CONSTITUTION OF POSTGENOMIC LIFE 3–7 (2006).
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Underlying these competing conceptions of the status of tissue are,
moreover, competing conceptions of the human subject and the role that
nonexpert citizens should have in shaping the direction of biomedicine.
The Common Rule’s transformation of tissue from a private to public good
is explicitly achieved through a legal reconceptualization of the human
subject from whom the tissue is derived. Prior to anonymization, the law
treats research on biobanked tissue as research on a human subject for
which consent is required; post anonymization, there is—as a matter of
law—no longer a human subject involved. The right of attribution strategy,
by contrast, would allow a human subject to ensure that his biobanked
tissue remained not only literally identified with him, but also an extension
of his legal self. Under this approach, human subjects would be more than
mere donors to the public sector research enterprise, but rather—if they
chose—participants in it.258
Thus, choosing between anonymity and attribution rules may involve not
only taking a position on the proper balancing of considerations of
efficiency and justice, but also a more fundamental choice between what
might be considered competing bioconstitutional orders.259 At its core, the
decision of whether ordinary citizens will be able to shape the direction of
public sector biomedical research with their biocapital (rather than a more
limited bundle of resources, such as money, energy, time, and voice) is
much like the decision of whether they will be able to shape political
outcomes by voting openly with their voices and their financial capital
(rather than in anonymizing voting and donation booths). Both decisions
entail choices between competing conceptions of the proper capacities of
the subjects of a liberal democracy.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have demonstrated that anonymity has been
misconceived as an aspect of privacy, and as a result, its distinct and
powerful role in our law has gone unrecognized. Differentiating the two
concepts, I have argued that whereas privacy hides facts about someone
whose identity is known, often by removing information and other goods
from public circulation, anonymity hides the identity of someone about
whom facts are known, often for the purpose of putting such goods into
public circulation.
Building on this distinction, I have demonstrated that anonymity and
attribution rules perform a previously unrecognized and pervasive role in
our law’s production of goods—in domains ranging from contract and
copyright, to criminal law and constitutional law. And I have proposed an
instrumental taxonomy of the three core forms that these rules take,
258. This is, of course, not the only way to achieve this result. For very different
proposals, see Kris Saha & J. Benjamin Hurlbut, Treat Donors As Partners in Biobank
Research, 478 NATURE 312 (2011), and David E. Winickoff & Richard N. Winickoff, The
Charitable Trust As a Model for Genomic Biobanks, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1180 (2003).
259. On bioconstitutionalism generally, see the collection of essays in REFRAMING
RIGHTS: BIOCONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE GENETIC AGE (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 2011).
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showing that production functions are achieved not only by making
anonymity and attribution into rights, but also conditions of exercising
rights, and most surprisingly, triggers that extinguish rights.
While our law’s uses of these varied rules have often been unreflective, I
have argued that they can be generally explained by a theory that identifies
their common impacts on three phases in the production of goods: creation,
evaluation, and allocation. Specifically, I have identified how the rules
allow us to shape the costs and benefits of creating goods in order to align
private incentives with public goals and values, control information flows in
order to address evaluation costs associated with using goods that have been
created, and alter rights of control over goods in order to achieve their
efficient or fair allocation.
Furthermore, and most importantly, I have demonstrated that my
taxonomy and theory together provide a framework for institutional design
that can be invaluable in rethinking and revising our law. Focusing on a
handful of difficult and pressing questions concerning the production of
specific biomedical and democratic goods, I have shown that my analysis
reveals a previously unrecognized set of institutional design levers and
valuable lessons in their use, each of which can be applied more generally
in the development of law and policy. In addition, I have suggested that
although multiple combinations of rules can be used to address the same
problem of production, the different options are not always functionally
equivalent in every way.
Rather, they can instantiate competing
conceptions of the nature of the goods being produced, and of the proper
legal capacities of the subjects of a liberal democracy—a possibility that
raises rich normative questions that I have by necessity set aside for future
treatment.

